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I. INTRODUCTION 
As the Internet continues to develop and people become more invested 
in social networks and virtual communities, the role of private entities in 
governing these spaces becomes more important. Current cyberlaw theory 
and doctrine, however, is not particularly well-suited for analyzing the 
legitimacy of private governance. There is, accordingly, a substantial risk that 
emerging tensions in virtual communities will not be adequately recognized 
or addressed. This Article proposes a framework based upon rule of law 
theory through which to better conceptualize virtual community governance 
and suggest appropriate regulatory responses. The rule of law, as a discourse 
that highlights the potential for abuse of power and the legitimacy of 
governance, provides a particularly useful tool for examining the exercise of 
private power in virtual communities. 
This project follows partially from A. V. Dicey’s argument that in the 
absence of a substantive, written constitution, rule of law principles in the 
United Kingdom were protected by the evolution of private law doctrines 
that secured the substantive rights of citizens.1 This work also builds upon 
Paul Berman’s and Brian Fitzgerald’s recognitions that public constitutional 
values are threatened by unrestrained private governance.2
Part 
 Essentially, this 
Article argues that if private law rules are used to regulate the governance of 
virtual communities, then those private rules should be influenced by public 
governance principles—specifically, those of the rule of law, which provide 
the most appropriate discourse on the regulation of governance power.  
II of this Article examines the development of cyberlaw theory over 
the last two decades and argues that there is a severe tendency to delegitimize 
state intervention in private governance. In the mid-nineties, this 
delegitimization was accomplished predominantly by cyberspace 
exceptionalists, who argued that the Internet was so different from physical 
space that state laws should not apply. Gradually, this exceptionalism has 
given way to a recognition that while the Internet is regulable, the best mode 
                                                                                       
 1. A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 
187–88 (10th ed. 1959). 
 2. See Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value of 
Applying Constitutional Norms to Private Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263, 1269 (2000); 
Brian F. Fitzgerald, Software as Discourse: The Power of Intellectual Property in Digital Architecture, 18 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 384 (2000). 
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of regulation is generally to create and enforce strong property rights in 
internet resources in order to enable self-regulation. This Article argues that 
while autonomy is critical in virtual communities, both of these types of 
deterministic reasoning about governance are dangerous. By creating a false 
dichotomy between regulation and liberty, much of the current cyberlaw 
discourse risks misunderstanding the tensions that revolve around the 
legitimacy of governance in virtual communities. 
In Part III, this Article examines substantive conceptions of the rule of 
law as they relate to the governance of virtual communities. As a first step, 
rule of law ideals suggest that we ought to be wary of claims that providers 
require absolute control and absolute discretion over a community. One of 
the oldest strands of the rule of law requires legal authorization for the 
exercise of power. Incorporating this insight into cyberspace self-governance 
implies that the contracts that underpin participation in virtual communities 
ought to be enforceable against the providers of those communities as well 
as the participants. This proposition highlights some shortcomings in the 
ways that these contracts are drafted. Namely, they are drafted 
overwhelmingly in favor of the providers, grant wide discretionary powers, 
and greatly limit any potential liability to the providers. If a restraint on the 
arbitrary exercise of power is warranted, there should be concern about the 
enforcement of such agreements as written. 
Part III also considers the role of substantive external values in limiting 
the scope of cyberspace self-rule. This Part argues that the private law that is 
used to regulate private governance should be informed by public 
governance principles and that these substantive values should aid in 
determining appropriate limits to self-rule. This analysis canvasses a small 
number of substantive values: equality, freedom of speech, freedom of 
peaceful assembly, the right to privacy, protection of property, and rights of 
legal enforcement. While not all public governance principles should be 
directly applicable to virtual communities, rule of law ideals suggest that these 
principles should at least be taken into account when attempting to resolve 
tensions between participants and providers. 
Part IV contrasts the modern liberal conceptions of the rule of law that 
revolve around formal legality with the uncertainties of governance in virtual 
communities. These modern ideals of the rule of law require that laws be 
clear, consistent, general, equal, and certain—characteristics that private 
contractual governance in virtual communities do not generally possess. 
Accordingly, Part IV argues that in communities where predictability is 
important, it may be desirable, at least in some circumstances, for territorial 
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courts not to defer to rules that fail to live up to these ideals. This Part also 
considers the role of due process and procedural fairness in the 
administration of virtual communities and suggests that states may be able to 
encourage more legitimate internal governance mechanisms by examining the 
exercise of discretion in exceptional circumstances. 
Part V considers the role of consent in the governance of virtual 
communities. Since the theory supporting self-governance relies upon the 
consent of the participants in virtual communities to create better rules, we 
should be suspicious of contractual interpretations that conflict with internal 
norms. Where there is no conflict with substantive or formal values of the 
broader society, we ought to defer to the internal norms of the community in 
evaluating regulatory disputes. However, in cases where there is a conflict 
between internal consensual norms and a strict literal interpretation of the 
contractual terms of service, it may sometimes be appropriate for courts to 
refuse to uphold the contractual terms as written. This Part argues that if 
self-governance is encouraged for the creation of consensual rule sets, then 
providers may find themselves bound by the norms of the community they 
help to create, notwithstanding contractual provisions to the contrary. 
This Article concludes that the rule of law discourse highlights important 
tensions in virtual communities that standard legal liberal contractual 
doctrine is unable to adequately address. As the role of private virtual 
community governance becomes greater in the lives of its participants, 
reliance on standard contractual doctrine risks marginalizing public 
governance values. In evaluating responses to disputes between participants 
and providers of virtual communities, it is desirable to read governance 
principles into the private law that bounds cyberspace self-rule. In doing so, 
significant care must be taken to ensure that no harm is unduly done to the 
autonomy of virtual communities. Any legal framework must be sensitive to 
the real needs of the participants and providers of virtual communities and 
should avoid regulatory solutions that diminish the value and potential of the 
community. As these governance issues are contextually sensitive, a 
significant degree of flexibility is required in determining appropriate legal 
responses. States should not, however, allow private governance to override 
core governance values in ways that are detrimental to the interests of their 
citizens. 
II. THE DETERMINISTIC TREND IN CYBERLAW THEORY 
The legitimacy of governance within virtual communities is not easily 
assessable within the framework of current cyberlaw theory. Over the last 
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two decades, the cyberlaw discourse has greatly evolved, but a deterministic 
trend remains that tends to delegitimize state interference in the governance 
of virtual communities. While this trend is most visible in the early cyber 
libertarian approaches, it persists as a set of flawed assumptions in the later 
anti-separatist theory. Section II.A traces the development of cyberlaw theory 
to highlight these deterministic tendencies and the false dichotomy that has 
emerged between regulation and autonomy. Section II.B then introduces the 
rule of law as a useful framework for evaluating regulatory approaches in a 
way that is sensitive both to the legitimacy of private governance and the 
importance of autonomy in the development of online communities. 
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CYBERLAW THEORETICAL DISCOURSE 
The early cyber libertarians argued that cyberspace was a new, different 
space—one devoid of scarcity, whose boundless possibilities would provide 
better rules than any state-made law.3 This utopian vision delegitimized the 
role of state law in regulating cyberspace and asserted that self-rule of 
autonomous virtual communities was both freer and more legitimate than 
any law imposed by the territorial state. This is best understood as a 
recognition of the malleability of cyberspace—the seductive opportunity to 
shape these brave new worlds into ideal communities.4 In 1996, John Perry 
Barlow famously declared the independence of cyberspace, calling it “the 
new home of Mind.”5
[i]f the sysops and users who collectively inhabit and control a 
particular area of the Net want to establish special rules to govern 
conduct there, and if that rule set does not fundamentally impinge 
upon the vital interests of others who never visit this new space, 
then the law of sovereigns in the physical world should defer to 
this new form of self-government.
 David Johnson and David Post followed in the legal 
literature, making the argument in their 1996 article, Law and Borders, that 
“the fundamental principle” of internet governance should be that 
6
                                                                                       
 3. See David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in 
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1995) [hereinafter Johnson & Post, Law and Borders]; 
David G. Post, The Unsettled Paradox: The Internet, the State, and the Consent of the Governed, 5 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 521 (1997) [hereinafter Post, Unsettled Paradox]; John Perry 
Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (Feb. 8, 1996), http://homes.eff.org/-
~barlow/Declaration-Final.html; David G. Post & David R. Johnson, The Great Debate, 11 
FIRST MONDAY (Feb. 2006), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/-
fm/article/viewArticle/1311/1231 [hereinafter Post & Johnson, The Great Debate]. 
 
 4. Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 217 (2007). 
 5. Barlow, supra note 3. 
 6. Johnson & Post, Law and Borders, supra note 3, at 1393. 
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In this ideal world, whenever the rules that govern participation in any 
given community become undesirable, a user has a practically unfettered 
ability to move to another community with a different rule set, or to create 
and grow a new community.7 The ability to easily move in and out of virtual 
communities will create a market for rule sets, resulting in rules that are more 
responsive to the demands of participants. This allows participants to self-
select into communities whose rule sets more closely reflect their needs and 
desires.8 The lack of scarcity and ease of exit in virtual communities provides 
“a more legitimate ‘selection mechanism’ by which differing rule sets will 
evolve over time.”9
This exceptionalist treatment of cyberspace as completely separate from 
physical space gave way, largely, to the recognition that cyberspace was 
subject to the same regulatory forces as physical space, and indeed, was no 
different from physical space.
  
10 It became clear that the utopian libertarian 
dream was premised not on self-governance and the delegitimization of the 
state but upon the creation and maintenance of state-granted property 
rights.11 Closer analysis of the software code through which communication 
was mediated showed not only that the architecture of cyberspace had a 
regulatory function,12 but that it could, and in some cases should, be bent to 
the will of the state.13
                                                                                       
 7. Id. at 1383, 1398–99. 
 The recognition that cyberspace was already regulated 
 8. See Post, Unsettled Paradox, supra note 3, at 539 (arguing that the decentralized 
generation of law online is made by “the aggregate of the choices made by individual system 
operators about what rules to impose, and by individual users about which online 
communities to join”).  
 9. Johnson & Post, Law and Borders, supra note 3, at 1398–99. 
 10. See James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors, 
66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 178 (1997); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1199 (1998) (challenging both normative and descriptive claims against public 
regulation of cyberspace); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999) (explaining four modalities of regulation of cyberspace); 
Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism 
in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295 (1998) (pointing out that self-governance in 
cyberspace is always reliant on background legal rules); Timothy Wu, Application-Centered 
Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1163 (1999) (discussing public and private regulation of 
internet applications). 
 11. See Radin & Wagner, supra note 10, at 1296–97. 
 12. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 676 (1998) 
[hereinafter Lessig, The New Chicago School]; see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER 
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999) [hereinafter LESSIG, CODE] (describing the interaction of 
code, norms, the market, and the law in the regulation of cyberspace). 
 13. See Graham Greenleaf, An Endnote on Regulating Cyberspace: Architecture vs. Law, 21 U. 
NEW S. WALES L.J. 593 (1998); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of 
Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 557 (1998). 
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and always regulable struck a blow to the utopian vision and severely 
damaged the project to isolate cyberspace from the interference of the 
territorial state. 
In the place of a utopian technological determinism, however, rose a 
determinism of market rule—a suggestion that cyberspace could be best 
regulated through the creation and enforcement of strong and clear property 
rights.14 The exceptionalist nature of cyberspace had disappeared, but the end 
result was very similar: state interference in the governance of cyberspace was 
delegitimized in the name of autonomy and innovation.15 Judge Frank 
Easterbrook signalled the beginnings of this change, in a famous exhortation 
to cyberlaw scholars in 1996, when he argued that the risk of legal error in 
regulating cyberspace meant that the best regulatory approach would be to 
create new property rights, allowing for efficient bargaining between users.16 
For Easterbrook, if rules are clear, if strong property rights exist, and if 
institutions can be created to facilitate bargaining, then Coasean determinism 
will prevail and an efficient result will emerge irrespective of the initial 
allocation of entitlements.17 If society could just let “the world of cyberspace 
evolve as it will,” everyone could simply “enjoy the benefits.”18
Allowing virtual communities to determine their own rules is intuitively 
appealing to the liberal ideal of autonomy and self-determination. The claim 
is that “cyberspace self-governance more fully embodies the liberal 
democratic goals of individual liberty, popular sovereignty, and the consent 
of the governed than does the top-down administration of even the most 
democratic nation states.”
 
19
                                                                                       
 14. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
207, 212 (1996); Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 
IND. L.J. 803, 818–19 (2001); Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 217, 236 (1996). 
 In an ideal world, individuals will be able to self-
select into communities that reflect their needs and desires, thus allowing a 
 15. See F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1, 72–73 (2004) (concluding that while virtual worlds are subject to legal regulation, 
courts should “recognize that virtual worlds are jurisdictions separate from our own” in 
order to allow internal governance to develop); see also R. Polk Wagner, On Software Regulation, 
78 S. CAL. L. REV. 457 (2004) (arguing that creating strong property rights supports the 
desirable development of cyberspace self-regulation). 
 16. Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 212. 
 17. Id. at 212–13 (citing R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & 
ECON. 1, 212 (1959)).  
 18. Id. at 216. 
 19. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal 
Democratic Theory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 395, 402 (2000). 
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range of diverse communities to cater to each individual taste.20 In this ideal 
world, the norms that develop in virtual communities are generally better than 
any law that could be imposed by the state because they can be tailored for 
and by the participants themselves.21 Johnson and Post argued that 
individuals are “more likely to be in possession of the relevant information 
regarding . . . their own welfare” than will elected officials.22 Therefore, 
individuals can use their ability to enter and exit virtual communities to 
reflect their needs and desires, potentially resulting in rule sets that can react 
faster and more flexibly to changing environments and externalities imposed 
by other communities.23
This emphasis on self-determination has been taken up in the virtual 
worlds literature, particularly by Lastowka and Hunter.
  
24 Their arguments 
express the concern that “the complexity of ascertaining a virtual world’s 
emerging legal rules and balancing them” with participant and provider 
interests will result in bad decisions by real-world courts on virtual disputes.25 
As virtual communities develop their own rules, “[c]ourts will need to 
recognize that virtual worlds are jurisdictions separate from our own, with 
their own distinctive community norms, laws, and rights.”26 As these 
(“cyborg”) communities develop, the role of territorial law will fade: “If these 
attempts by cyborg communities to formulate the laws of virtual worlds go 
well, there may be no need for real-world courts to participate in this process. 
Instead, the residents of virtual worlds will live and love and law for 
themselves.”27
Other academics have noted that allowing providers to create expressive 
or entertaining spaces requires substantial autonomy to determine internal 
 
                                                                                       
 20. Johnson & Post, Law and Borders, supra note 3, at 1398; Post, Unsettled Paradox, supra 
note 3, at 539; Post & Johnson, The Great Debate, supra note 3. 
 21. Post & Johnson, The Great Debate, supra note 3. 
 22. David G. Post & David R. Johnson, Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent: Towards a 
New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055, 
1087–88 (1997). 
 23. See id. 
 24. Lastowka and Hunter were careful to distinguish Johnson and Post’s 
“precyberskeptic ambitious thinking about ‘cyberspaces’ as a separate jurisdiction” on the 
basis that the Internet, more broadly, “never became an independent community.” For 
Lastowka and Hunter, law and self-rule would only evolve where there was a real 
community, and the best example of new communities forming was in virtual worlds, which 
meant that “the emergence of virtual law within those worlds [was] much more likely.” 
Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 15, at 69. 
 25. Id. at 71. 
 26. Id. at 73. 
 27. Id. 
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norms.28 This approach has also found favor in law and economics discourse. 
Richard Epstein makes the argument that an absolute right to exclude, which 
centralizes the power in the hands of the provider, forms the basis for the 
development of private rules and that “private voluntary arrangements will 
outperform forced interactions in the long run.”29
Each of these arguments shares a common thread, specifically that 
governance by the local virtual community is likely to be better than rules 
imposed from external sources. Many of these arguments for self-governance 
are based upon ideal world assumptions where there is little to no scarcity, 
where participants can come and go without friction, where new 
communities can quickly and cheaply be established when existing rule sets 
are no longer appropriate, and where participants are empowered to choose 
communities whose rules suit their needs and desires. In a non-ideal world, 
these assumptions are all suspect; there are significant limits to self-
governance that must be addressed in any regulatory framework.
  
30
1. The Flawed Assumptions in the Development of  Cyberlaw Theoretical 
Discourse 
  
First is the problem of exit. Fundamentally, the assumption that a 
marketplace for norms will emerge is severely limited if participants are not 
able to easily leave one community for another.31 Providers of virtual 
communities, however, have an incentive to make the community difficult to 
leave.32
                                                                                       
 28. See Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual 
Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 2043, 2046 (2004) (discussing the freedom to design); Edward 
Castronova, The Right to Play, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 185, 196 (2004).  
 Subscription and ad-supported communities earn more revenue for 
each participant and most communities benefit from the network effects of 
 29. Epstein, supra note 14, at 819; see also Richard A. Epstein, Intel v. Hamidi: The Role 
of Self-Help in Cyberspace, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 147, 157 (2005) (arguing that supporting self-
help through strong property rights provides more efficient outcomes than state regulation 
of speech). 
 30. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in Cyberspace—Rights Without Laws, 73 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 1155, 1166 (1997) (critiquing the technologically deterministic economic predictions 
that self-rule will result in better norms); Netanel, supra note 19 (arguing that cyberspace self-
rule should be limited to enhance liberal values). 
 31. See Dan L. Burk, Virtual Exit in the Global Information Economy, 73 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 943 (1997); Netanel, supra note 19, at 426. 
 32. See Sal Humphreys, “You’re In Our World Now” Ownership and Access in the Proprietary 
Community of an MMOG, in INFORMATION COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AND 
EMERGING BUSINESS STRATEGIES 76, 85 (Shenja Van Der Graaf & Yuichi Washida eds., 
2007) (arguing that “[t]he stronger the ties, the longer the engagement, and the longer the 
monthly subscription rolls in for the publisher”). 
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having more participants. As such, the total utility increases significantly with 
each additional connected individual.33
Thus, exit is nowhere near frictionless. A participant’s ability to leave a 
community is constrained by the social connections she has developed or 
strengthened with other people, with whom she would lose an important 
point of contact, context, and common interest.
 
34
The second problem is the considerable barriers to the creation of new 
communities. When Johnson and Post were first writing in the mid-nineties, 
barriers to the establishment of new communities were reasonably low, as it 
was relatively trivial to create a new channel or new server for Internet Relay 
Chat, a new Usenet newsgroup, or a new text-based virtual world.
 Any investment she has 
made in social capital, reputation, or virtual property within the community, 
none of which is easily transferable to other communities, makes it harder 
for her to leave. Further, and this hints at the next problem, exit is 
constrained by the availability of other communities that offer reasonably 
substitutable experiences. 
35
                                                                                       
 33. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 
75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985) (defining network externalities); S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. 
Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133 (1994) (explaining 
network externalities with respect to software and computer networks); see also danah m. 
boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship, 13 J. 
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 218 (2008) (explaining that most, but not all, social 
networking sites aim for exponential growth). 
 The ease 
with which new services could be offered suggested that any harm caused by 
poor governance could readily be overcome by joining or creating a new 
community. Modern virtual communities, however, are much less readily 
created. Millions of dollars of investment in coding, artwork, testing, and 
marketing go into the creation of large-scale virtual worlds. Even where 
communities can be built on relatively simple technology, they will often fail 
to reach or maintain the critical mass required to sustain a large-scale 
community. Small-scale communities may still be created relatively trivially, 
but the importance of network effects generally ensures that these 
 34. T. L. TAYLOR, PLAY BETWEEN WORLDS: EXPLORING ONLINE GAME CULTURE 
135 (2006) (explaining that despite participants’ opposition to structures of technological 
systems, it is not easy to refrain from participating); Sal Humphreys, Ruling the Virtual World: 
Governance in Massively Multiplayer Online Games, 11 EUR. J. CULTURAL STUD. 149, 163 (2008). 
 35. Johnson & Post, Law and Borders, supra note 3, at 1395 (“The ease with which 
internal borders, consisting entirely of software protocols, can be constructed is one of 
Cyberspace’s most remarkable and salient characteristics; setting up a new Usenet 
newsgroup, or a ‘listserver’ discussion group, requires little more than a few lines of code.”). 
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communities remain at the fringes, rarely attracting enough participants to 
seriously compete with larger communities.36
The third major problem with the ideal of a marketplace of norms is that 
it does not exist. Firms that provide virtual communities tend to draft 
contracts that are not designed to be easily read or understood by 
subscribers.
 
37 These contracts are typically dense, long, full of legalese, and 
presented in a way that discourages readers from actually reading the 
contract.38 Individual subscribers are at a significant disadvantage compared 
to the providers, who have the ability to amortize the high costs of 
understanding, drafting, and changing these agreements over a very large 
number of transactions.39 Finally, perhaps because subscribers are 
discouraged from reading and understanding the terms of service, there is 
very little competition in the market. Consequently, there is a high degree of 
homogeneity in the terms of service available from the various providers of 
virtual communities.40
These factors illustrate the assumption that cyberspace self-governance 
will always provide better results than externally imposed regulation is deeply 
flawed. It may be that virtual communities will develop legitimate rules for 
themselves.
 
41 Nevertheless, there can be no guarantee that providing strong 
property and contract rights and allowing communities to govern themselves 
will necessarily lead to desirable outcomes.42
                                                                                       
 36. TAYLOR, supra note 
 Indeed, legitimate self-
34, at 135 (“We might also consider the ways participating in 
particular forms or places always are tied up with questions of power. Separate does not 
mean equal, and sometimes we can see quite clearly the benefits that come from being in 
particular spaces.”). 
 37. See Dale Clapperton & Stephen Corones, Unfair Terms in “Clickwrap” and Other 
Electronic Contracts, 35 AUSTL. BUS. L. REV. 152 (2007). 
 38. See Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine, 160 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 142 (2004); see also Humphreys, supra note 34, at 
165 (“Many players never read the EULA or Terms of Service, lengthy documents written in 
legal discourse impenetrable to most of the world outside the legal profession.”). 
 39. Victor P. Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17 J.L. & ECON. 
461, 483–85 (1974); see also Clapperton & Corones, supra note 37; Andrew Robertson, The 
Limits of Voluntariness in Contract, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 179, 194 (2005) (explaining the 
imbalanced bargaining power between the consumer and the provider). 
 40. Andrew Jankowich, EULAw: The Complex Web of Corporate Rule-Making in Virtual 
Worlds, 8 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 49 (2006); Radin & Wagner, supra note 10, at 
1311–12. 
 41. Johnson & Post, Law and Borders, supra note 3, at 1388 (arguing that providers and 
subscribers “have begun explicitly to recognize that formulating and enforcing such rules 
should be a matter for principled discussion, not an act of will by whoever has control of the 
power switch”). 
 42. Netanel concludes: 
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governance is an extremely difficult ongoing process.43 Theorists have 
demonstrated that of the four modalities of regulation identified by Lessig 
(code, law, the market, and social norms),44 none are value neutral, and none 
can be relied upon to provide utopian results.45
While the assumptions that underpin both the technological determinism 
of the exceptionalists and the Coasean market determinism of the law and 
economics scholars have not gone unchallenged,
  
46 there remains some 
conceptual difficulty that surrounds the autonomy of online communities. 
The normative claim that online communities can develop better norms for 
interaction than state-imposed rules47
                                                                                       
An untrammeled cyberspace would ultimately be inimical to liberal 
democratic principles. It would free majorities to trample upon minorities 
and would serve as a breeding ground for invidious status discrimination, 
narrowcasting and mainstreaming content selection, systematic invasions 
of privacy, and gross inequalities in the distribution of basic requisites for 
netizenship and citizenship in the information age. 
 still holds some weight. Autonomy 
continues to be regarded as crucially important from a number of 
perspectives: that there is a fundamental right to design communities and to 
immerse oneself in spaces where the normal rules of the corporeal world do 
Netanel, supra note 19, at 498. 
 43. See A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward a Critical Theory of 
Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749 (2003) (demonstrating that the effort required to create a 
legitimate consensual governance regime was substantial, leading to an inference that not all 
communities will invest in the normative discourse required to create a workable and fair 
system).  
 44. Lessig, The New Chicago School, supra note 12, at 662–63. 
 45. See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 1257, 1292 (1997) (expressing concern about the legitimacy and lack of restraint on 
those enforcing non-legal norms); Netanel, supra note 19 (highlighting the inescapable 
inefficiencies and the substantial imbalances of power in the market); Radin & Wagner, supra 
note 10 (explaining that the legal property and contractual rights that underpin self-
governance claims entrench particular decisions about the definition and allocation of 
entitlements); see also Cohen, supra note 4, at 255 (“Many important questions have tended to 
slip between the cracks in an analytical universe that seeks to unpack ‘code’ while taking 
‘law,’ ‘norms,’ and ‘the market’ for granted.”). 
 46. See LESSIG, CODE, supra note 12; Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New 
Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998); Elkin-Koren, supra 
note 30; William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203 
(1998); F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, Virtual Crimes, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 293 
(2004); Lemley, supra note 45; Jonathan F. Fanton, Rights and Responsibilities Online: A Paradox 
for Our Times, 13 FIRST MONDAY (Aug. 9, 2008), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/-
bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2196. 
 47. See generally Johnson & Post, Law and Borders, supra note 3 (arguing that new rules 
will arise in virtual communities that differ from territorial, state-based rules, and that these 
rules should govern in virtual spaces). 
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not apply,48 that individuals with similar interests should be able to bargain 
for their own rules of association,49 that vibrant communities need regulatory 
freedom to create their own interesting norms,50 and that flexibility to 
determine rules is of paramount necessity for “maintaining and improving 
the environment for innovation, experimentation, and entrepreneurship.”51
This emphasis on autonomy is balanced, to an extent, by a recognition 
that internal governance should be limited in certain circumstances. What 
exactly these circumstances are is equally varied. Some form of property right 
in virtual assets is often thought to be worth protecting by territorial states.
  
52 
At other times, theorists have suggested that limits on the ability of providers 
to control speech may be appropriate, at least where the borders (particularly 
the economic borders) between actions in the community and the real world 
are porous.53 There have also been suggestions that the consent expressed by 
the contractual rules that bind participants should be procedurally protected 
from anti-competitive behavior54 and “force and fraud.”55
This tension between autonomy and regulation has led to the emergence 
of a false dichotomy. It seems to be generally understood that states can (and 
sometimes should) impose their will on the providers of virtual communities, 
but that doing so is likely to limit the ability of communities to develop 
consensual norms and cause harm to the diversity and vibrancy of online 
spaces that makes them particularly attractive in the first place. The result is 
 Unfortunately, 
however, no easy way to reconcile the need for autonomy with the disparate 
legitimate interests of participants has emerged. 
                                                                                       
 48. Balkin, supra note 28, at 2043, 2062; Castronova, supra note 28, at 202. 
 49. Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 81 (2003); Epstein, supra 
note 14. 
 50. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 15, at 61, 72–73; see also Richard A. Bartle, Virtual 
Worldliness: What the Imaginary Asks of the Real, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 19, 22 (2004) (arguing 
that freedom to design and regulate is fundamentally important in virtual communities). 
 51. Wagner, supra note 15, at 506.  
 52. See generally Joshua A. T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047 (2005) 
(arguing that creating property rights in virtual assets can help prevent anticommons that 
arise from fragmentation of rights to exclude); Andrew E. Jankowich, Property and Democracy 
in Virtual Worlds, 11 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 173 (2005) (arguing that creating enforceable 
property rights in virtual assets is necessary to help structure relationships and resolve 
disputes between participants and providers in virtual worlds); Lastowka & Hunter, supra 
note 15 (arguing that property theory generally supports creating property rights in virtual 
assets). 
 53. Balkin, supra note 28, at 2090; Castronova, supra note 28, at 204 (arguing for a 
strong legal distinction between play worlds and worlds with a porous economy).  
 54. Epstein, supra note 14, at 819. 
 55. Joshua A. T. Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts: The Contractual Governance of Virtual 
Worlds, 53 MCGILL L.J. 427, 468 (2008). 
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that state intervention in online community governance continues to be 
delegitimized, even as the harm caused to participants in examples of bad 
governance becomes more visible.  
2. Situating Cyberspace in Order to Overcome the Dichotomy Between 
Regulation and Autonomy 
A theoretical approach that is more sensitive to the ways in which 
different sources of regulatory power interact in online communities should 
be adopted in order to move beyond the dichotomy between regulation and 
autonomy. A key problem with the current cyberlaw governance discourse is 
that it has been largely “predicated on a teleology of disembodiment”56
This is particularly true in debates that center around cyberproperty and 
cybertrespass, where the analysis generally focuses on whether an enforceable 
right to exclude exists, but rarely considers the effect of such a right on 
community governance. There is a tendency to characterize such rights as 
absolutes, notwithstanding that their offline analogs are highly contextually 
sensitive and contain numerous complicated exceptions.
 that 
isolates participation in cyberspace from the remainder of lived experience. 
Much of current cyberlaw discourse positions law and the market as 
bounding forces that structure isolated zones of liberal self-governance. This 
discourse is flawed because it tends to focus on the existence and operation 
of rights to exclude based on property or contract law as the borders of 
acceptable regulation, particularly between public regulation and private 
governance.  
57 The mere 
existence of a right to exclude tells very little about any limitations that may 
be imposed on the exercise of such a right.58
The cyberproperty debate is not, however, the only part of cyberlaw 
theory that maintains a relatively sharp dichotomy between regulated and 
unregulated zones of self-governance. These distinctions are also quite 
popular in the virtual worlds discourse where theorists often try to separate 
 
                                                                                       
 56. Cohen, supra note 4, at 255. 
 57. Michael A. Carrier & Greg Lastowka, Against Cyberproperty, 22 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1485, 1498 (2007) [hereinafter Carrier & Lastowka, Against Cyberproperty]; see also F. 
Gregory Lastowka, Decoding Cyberproperty, 40 IND. L. REV. 23, 46–47 (2007) [hereinafter 
Lastowka, Decoding Cyberproperty] (questioning the assumption that private property rights in 
“cyberspace” is the best means of promoting the public good). 
 58. Carrier & Lastowka, Against Cyberproperty, supra note 57, at 1508–09 (arguing that 
limits are fundamentally important to property, but conceptions of cyberproperty tend not 
to include limits). 
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games and expressive spaces from more quotidian platforms.59 In these 
conceptions, social spaces that allow property or cross-border real-money 
trades are typically treated as regulable, whereas “play” spaces are held to 
remain free from state interference.60 The desire to protect the integrity of 
play or expressive spaces is understandable; there is clearly a threat that an 
overly limited capacity to mold the community experience will greatly 
jeopardize the enjoyableness or expressiveness of the spaces.61 While these 
concerns are significant, however, it does not necessarily follow that the 
providers of all such spaces require absolute power over the community. 
Some tensions will obviously be less relevant in play and expressive spaces, 
but there are still legitimate concerns about other potential abuses of private 
power.62
Perhaps the most pronounced example of this disembodied dichotomy is 
the tendency to resort to contractual doctrine as a model for evaluating 
disputes in virtual communities.
 
63
                                                                                       
 59. See Balkin, supra note 
 While recognizing that contractual limits 
do exist and apply, this model obviates the need to evaluate internal 
governance within those boundaries. So long as the contractual documents 
that purport to govern participation are upheld, then regulating governance 
becomes a simple matter of contractual interpretation. Unfortunately, a 
predominantly private contractual model of governance imports all the 
familiar baggage of liberal contract theory and does a poor job of structuring 
the potentially conflicting interests of providers and participants in virtual 
28, at 2072; Castronova, supra note 28, at 204; Lastowka & 
Hunter, supra note 15, at 70–72 (contrasting cyberspace in general with the claims for 
autonomy made by virtual communities); James Grimmelmann, Virtual World Feudalism, 
YALE L.J. POCKET PART (Jan. 18, 2009), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-
journal-pocket-part/property-law/virtual-world-feudalism/. 
 60. See generally Joshua A. T. Fairfield, The Magic Circle, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 
823 (2008) (explaining and critiquing the concept of the “magic circle,” a metaphor used to 
isolate play spaces from the “real world”). 
 61. See Bartle, supra note 50, at 27; Castronova, supra note 28, at 202. 
 62. See TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 19 (“In much the same way we now see the 
relationship between on- and offline life as not a bounded one, in many ways a game/not-
game dichotomy does not hold.”). 
 63. Fairfield, supra note 55, at 435 (noting that in virtual worlds, “questions of property 
law, tort law, and even criminal law are uniformly construed by the courts as contract 
disputes”). Fairfield hints at the inadequacy of reducing governance to a contractual 
framework by arguing that private contract law is unable to provide the stable default rules 
that societies need to govern interaction between participants. Fairfield’s analysis, however, 
focuses on the horizontal relationships between participants, and does not consider the 
relationship between participants and providers in any great detail. Fairfield does consider 
vertical relationships, but mainly notes that contractual law makes it much more difficult to 
define clear ownership rights in virtual property than does property law itself. Id. at 454–57. 
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communities. This model makes problematic assumptions about the way that 
individual participants bargain and contract to enter communities: rationally 
evaluating risk and retaining at all times the consumer sovereignty of being 
able to simply leave a community whose governance structure becomes 
objectionable. It imposes an assumption of market determinism that 
participants will express their demand for certain rule sets and this demand 
will be satisfied through standard economic forces, as long as property and 
contract rights are sufficiently well-defined and easily transferable.64 Most 
importantly, perhaps, it reduces community participation to simple consumer 
transactions, which tends to downplay or ignore the set of tensions that 
revolve around the legitimacy of governance.65
The critical insight here is that the dichotomy between absolute self-rule 
and a complete lack of autonomy is false. The borders of regulation are much 
more complex and interesting than is typically recognized,
 
66 and “[t]o admit 
only dreams of total freedom or total control seems too limiting.”67
[T]he processes that construct power in networked space] are social 
and emergent, and have consequences both spatial and material. 
They operate in what Saskia Sassen terms “analytic borderlands”: 
between public and private, between technical and social, and 
between network and body. Mapping these borderlands requires 
descriptive and analytical tools that do not simply reduce them to 
borders.
 By 
continuing to conceptualize cyberspace governance as isolated zones of 
liberal self-rule, simply bounded by contractual doctrine, the tensions that 
revolve around private governance risk being misunderstood. Julie Cohen, 
drawing from science and technology studies, argues:  
68
This argument appears to be fundamentally correct. The relationships of 
power within virtual communities are important because the people within 
those communities “are real people, not simply disembodied virtual users.”
 
69
                                                                                       
 64. See Easterbrook, supra note 
 
The contested interplay between the various forces at work, the borderlands 
of regulation, is of primary importance to the construction of power in 
14, at 209–16; Epstein, supra note 14; Hardy, supra note 
14, at 219, 236–58 (discussing transaction costs and costs of drawing boundary lines). 
 65. See Nicolas Suzor, On the (Partially) Inalienable Rights of Participants in Virtual 
Communities, 130 MEDIA INT’L AUSTL. 90 (2009). 
 66. See Radin & Wagner, supra note 10, at 1297. 
 67. Cohen, supra note 4, at 224. 
 68. Id. at 251 (citing SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM 
MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES 379–86 (2006)).  
 69. Id. at 221. 
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cyberspace.70 These borderlands are the sites of the power struggles that 
directly affect the interests of the real people who participate in these 
communities, and “[t]he emergent geographies of power within networked 
space shape the conditions of possibility, the conditions of participation, and 
the conditions of material existence.”71
These emergent geographies of power in networked space need a 
different approach than the liberal framework through which the law 
typically views power relations. The core problem with the traditional legal 
liberal approach is that it tends to ignore the existence and flow of power in 
the private sphere. Brian Fitzgerald explains:  
 
Traditionally, constitutionalism (which means the regulation of 
power) has focused on regulating or limiting the vertical exercise of 
government or public power over the citizen. On the other hand, 
the horizontal exercise of power between citizens has occurred in 
the private sphere and has been rarely analyzed in terms of power 
or constitutionalism, although the (largely common) law has played 
a mediating role.72
Fitzgerald concludes that “[p]ower relations in the private sphere . . . are 
fundamental constitutional issues that should be informed by fundamental 
constitutional principles.”
 
73 This notion, also known as “constitutive 
constitutionalism” allows society to grapple with constitutional values that 
are otherwise marginalized by the public-private divide.74
                                                                                       
 70. However, Epstein argues that we should address “the . . . basic outlines” of 
property rules first, rather than the details: 
 These public 
community values are sometimes threatened by the private exercise of power 
in cyberspace (and elsewhere), and these concerns should be explicit: 
The success and the glory of any legal system is not how it resolves hard 
marginal cases, but rather how it sets out the rules that allow most routine 
transactions to go from cradle to grave without so much as a hint of 
litigation. . . . All the while, we must remember that even if sound legal 
principles do not eliminate every anomaly or answer every single question 
of system design, they can help us avoid major errors that could carry with 
them disastrous social consequences. We can live with gray areas, so long 
as we have black and white, but we cannot live with fundamental flaws in 
system design. 
Epstein, supra note 14, at 827; see also Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 211 (arguing that the risk 
of legal error justifies the granting of property rights that are easy to reverse in private 
transactions, rather than attempting to determine the optimal allocation of entitlements). 
 71. Cohen, supra note 4, at 255. 
 72. Fitzgerald, supra note 2, at 382. 
 73. Id. at 384. 
 74. Berman, supra note 2, at 1269. 
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[I]f it is true that we already think of the Constitution as embodying 
such constitutive values of our society, it may seem quite natural to 
use the Constitution as a touchstone for evaluating a broader range 
of social interaction. Moreover, an argument based on constitutive 
constitutionalism may also be particularly persuasive in the context 
of debating online regulation, because in cyberspace it is perhaps 
easier to see how private entities can threaten cherished 
constitutional norms.75
The point is not to directly extend constitutional regulation to the 
governance of virtual communities, as there are of course many important 
respects in which a virtual community is not like a real state and should not 
be regulated as one. What is important is the direct confrontation of 
constitutional values, while considering how they can inform the current 
regulatory discourse. It is these public values that are most under threat by 
private governance, and it certainly seems desirable to examine much more 
closely what effects marginalizing these values have on the people who 
participate in these spaces. 
 
The attractiveness of cyberspace, its seductive appeal, is largely based 
upon the explicit promise of malleability—the largely unbounded choices 
that shape the world to be inhabited. The important question has been “what 
kinds of alternate social orderings do we imagine and seek to enable?”76 Julie 
Cohen, however, makes explicit the second part of this question: “[w]hich 
attributes of real space do we seek to perfect and harness in the service of 
utopian ambitions?”77 Cyberspace is neither wholly distinct nor wholly 
similar to regular space.78 Answering these questions requires direct 
consideration of the constitutive limits that shape power relations in 
cyberspace, with the explicit goal of determining whether they are 
appropriate for the spaces society is trying to construct. One glaring omission 
in current regulatory approaches is the limitation of the exercise of power, 
leading to the fear expressed by a number of theorists about the potential for 
the rampant abuse of “private” power in a system that predicates legitimacy 
on a sharp distinction between public and private spheres.79
                                                                                       
 75. Id. at 1270. 
 
 76. Cohen, supra note 4, at 222; see also Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of 
the Digital Anticommons, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 439, 443–44 (2003); Johnson & Post, Law and 
Borders, supra note 3, at 1378–79. 
 77. Cohen, supra note 4, at 222. 
 78. Id. at 219–21. 
 79. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 285–93 (2006) (contrasting the 
emergence of private norms with public governance and the potential tensions where those 
1817-1886_SUZOR WEB (DO NOT DELETE) 7/5/2011 10:27 PM 
2010] RULE OF LAW IN VIRTUAL COMMUNITIES 1835 
The constitutional discourse serves to highlight some of what may be 
lacking in virtual governance. Contrasting the values believed to be important 
in corporeal states with the way in which virtual communities are governed 
can help to identify potentially desirable regulatory approaches.80 In looking 
at virtual communities experientially to see both how they are different from 
real spaces and how they are the same, one of the striking realizations is that 
limitations on the exercise of power are conspicuously absent. Thus, as the 
use of virtual communities grows in importance in all aspects of a citizen’s 
life, the public law of the state is slowly replaced by the private “law” of the 
provider.81
If we continue assuming . . . that the mass-market contractual 
regime is efficacious, then it is obvious that for a large subset of the 
social order . . . the law of the state . . . has been superseded by the 
promulgated contractual regime, the “law” of the firm. In the 
limiting case . . . the official constitutional/legislative/judicial 
regime is completely irrelevant. In situations short of the limiting 
case, but in which large numbers of people are subject to these 
superseding regimes, the official constitutional/legislative/judicial 
regime is severely eroded or marginalized.
 There is substantial danger in a world where contractual regimes 
promulgated by firms are enforced as written by the courts and largely 
accepted as effective by both participants and providers:  
82
As this process continues, important constitutional principles may begin 
to fade in relevance, to our collective detriment. In these cases, it may be 
more desirable to attempt to read these values into the regulatory framework 
that bounds self-governance in virtual communities.  
 
                                                                                       
norms are not just); Elkin-Koren, supra note 30, at 1186–87; Netanel, supra note 19, at 482–
83; Radin, supra note 38, at 146–47.  
 80. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 
174 (2008) (arguing that we need discussion and “lawyers who can help translate the 
principles of fairness and due process that have been the subject of analysis for liberal 
democracies into a new space where private parties and groups come together with varying 
degrees of hierarchy to try to solve the problems . . . in the digital space”); see also Fanton, 
supra note 46 (analyzing the “Internet’s democratic promise and lack of democratic 
protections”). 
 81. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 221 (arguing that as cyberspaces “increasingly replace (or 
displace) their real-space analogues, the rules governing them become increasingly 
important”); Humphreys, supra note 34, at 166 (arguing that “[a]s people with access to these 
technologies come to live more of their social lives (and work lives) in online environments, 
and to construct both their identities and communities in proprietary spaces, the terms under 
which they do so will become increasingly important”); Radin, supra note 38. 
 82. Radin, supra note 38, at 6 (using the extended propertization of copyright as an 
example). 
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B. USING THE RULE OF LAW TO BETTER CONCEPTUALIZE PRIVATE 
GOVERNANCE POWER 
One of the most concerning characteristics of private governance in 
virtual communities is that it is very seldom transparent, clear, or predictable, 
and providers often purport to have absolute discretion on the exercise of 
their power to eject participants under both contract and property law.83
In order to better conceptualize these issues, it is useful to analyze the 
power of providers through the constitutional lens of the ideals of the rule of 
law, which operates in Western democratic theory as a fundamentally 
important limitation on the abuse of public power. The rule of law is a 
contested set of ideals that consists of a number of different strands, none of 
which can be universally or directly applied to the governance of virtual 
communities, but each of which serves to highlight potential shortcomings in 
private governance. These strands include restraints on discretionary power,
 If 
the absolute discretion of the provider tends to be upheld, participants are 
likely to be exposed to a lack of certainty and stability in their communities 
and will be potentially vulnerable to the arbitrary and malicious exercise of 
power by the providers. Private governance, understood in this absolutist 
sense, offers none of the safeguards of corporeal public governance.  
84 
substantive limits based upon individual rights,85 formal limits on the creation 
and implementation of laws,86 procedural safeguards and due process,87 and 
an emphasis on consensual governance.88
                                                                                       
 83. Jankowich, supra note 
 The rule of law discourse provides 
a rich set of theoretical critiques about the legitimacy of governance and, as 
such, provides an appropriate framework through which to evaluate the 
legitimacy of governance in virtual communities and the legal limits that 
could be imposed on the exercise of private governance power. 
40, at 20 (arguing that the interpretation of contractual rules 
by proprietors “is more likely to be and appear arbitrary” than under the common law); see 
also id. at 45 (noting that three-quarters of virtual world contracts surveyed “allowed the 
proprietor to delete a player account at the proprietor’s discretion”). 
 84. See DICEY, supra note 1, at 187–88. 
 85. See T. R. S. ALLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE: A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE RULE 
OF LAW 27 (2001); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 93 (1986).  
 86. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (2nd ed. 1969); FRIEDRICH A. VON 
HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (50th anv. ed. 1994); Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its 
Virtue, 93 L.Q. REV. 195 (1977). 
 87. See ALLAN, supra note 85, at 121; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 239 (9th ed. 
1972); Raz, supra note 86, at 201–02. 
 88. See JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: TOWARD A DISCOURSE 
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 449 (William Rehg trans., 1996); John Locke, Second 
Treatise, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 95 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
3d ed. 1988) (1690). 
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If contractual governance is viewed as a purely private and autonomous 
enterprise and the creation and enforcement of internal norms is wholly 
deferred to providers, the role of law in shaping the lives of those within 
virtual communities becomes marginalized.89 If law is not merely restrictive 
or wholly subject to the interests of the powerful, but can and does play a 
useful role in restraining the raw exercise of power,90 then reducing the role 
of law poses a risk in that power within virtual communities is not subject to 
the rule of law. The rule of law provides a framework through which it is 
possible to contrast the ideals of governance in a liberal democracy with the 
reality of everyday private governance in virtual communities. As virtual 
communities grow in importance and become more central to the lives of a 
rapidly increasing number of users, the idea that governance is unimportant 
in these spaces because they are private is not just archaic, but dangerous. 
While the rule of law is often thought of as solely relevant to public law, this 
is not necessarily the case. A. V. Dicey argued that the rule of law “pervades” 
the English common law, as the “general principles of the 
constitution . . . are . . . the result of judicial decisions determining the rights 
of private persons in particular cases brought before the courts.”91
[T]he division between public and private law, though important, 
can never be safely invoked without reference to the specific 
context . . . . [T]here can be no clear-cut distinction between the 
state and other “quasi-public” bodies, or even private associations 
that exercise significant power over their own members. As the 
problems of abuse of power by non-governmental bodies becomes 
more clearly recognized, the common law is capable of generating 
appropriate requirements of fairness and rationality in private law.
 This point 
remains as important today as it was a century ago:  
92
The values of the rule of law have important ramifications for private law 
and private relationships, although the “countervailing public interest in 
protecting people’s constitutional freedom to define the terms of their own 
association as they see fit” must be recognized.
  
93
                                                                                       
 89. Radin, supra note 
 While rule of law values 
cannot provide a wholly determinative answer, they do provide an important 
38, at 147. 
 90. E. P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 266 
(1990). 
 91. DICEY, supra note 1, at 195. 
 92. ALLAN, supra note 85, at 11; see also T. R. S. ALLAN, LAW, LIBERTY, AND JUSTICE: 
THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH CONSTITUTIONALISM 4 (1993) (“[T]he ideas and 
values of which the rule of law consists are reflected and embedded in the ordinary common 
law.”). 
 93. ALLAN, supra note 85, at 12. 
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normative framework through which to conceptualize and evaluate tensions 
about private governance in virtual communities. By exposing the underlying 
tensions and presenting a framework that is sensitive to both legitimacy and 
autonomy, rule of law values can provide guidance for desirable outcomes 
when disputes arise around governance in virtual communities. 
Because they provide an established discourse about the legitimate 
exercise of governance power, rule of law values form the most important 
component of the constitutional discourse that ought to inform the 
continued development of cyberspace governance and regulation.94
In virtual worlds, the relationship between platform owners and 
players is not simply one between producers and consumers. 
Rather, it is often a relationship of governors to citizens. Virtual 
worlds form communities that grow and develop in ways that the 
platform owners do not foresee and cannot fully control. Virtual 
worlds quickly become joint projects between platform owners and 
players. The correct model is thus not the protection of the players’ 
interests solely as consumers, but a model of joint governance.
 Rule of 
law values are particularly useful in that they provide a framework that is 
much more familiar with the tensions of legitimate governance than is the 
contractual doctrine generally used to evaluate private governance disputes. 
A governance framework is required to evaluate tensions in virtual worlds 
(and virtual communities more broadly):  
95
Mark Zuckerberg, founder of Facebook, expressed a similar point of view 
in early 2009 when Facebook decided to seek user input on its Terms of 
Service.
 
96
Our terms aren’t just a document that protect our rights; it’s the 
governing document for how the service is used by everyone across 
the world. Given its importance, we need to make sure the terms 
reflect the principles and values of the people using the service.  
 Zuckerberg explicitly recognizes the tension between contractual 
and governance discourses where the Terms of Service are used in a way that 
governs participation: 
Our next version will be a substantial revision from where we are 
now. It will reflect . . . how people share and control their 
information, and it will be written clearly in language everyone can 
understand. Since this will be the governing document that we’ll all 
                                                                                       
 94. See Berman, supra note 2; Fitzgerald, supra note 2. 
 95. Balkin, supra note 28, at 2082. 
 96. See Caroline McCarthy, Facebook’s About-face: Change We can Believe In?, SOCIAL (Feb. 
18, 2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-10166663-36.html. 
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live by, Facebook users will have a lot of input in crafting these 
terms.97
Because contractual terms of service play a constitutive role in virtual 
communities, it makes sense to use constitutional discourse to examine their 
effect on private governance. Historically, rule of law ideals, in particular, 
have pervasively shaped the evaluation of territorial governments. At least in 
Western liberal democracies, these ideals form a large part of what it means 
to have good governance.
 
98 The vocabulary of the rule of law seems to fit 
reasonably comfortably with emerging tensions in the governance of virtual 
communities. The concern that the law of the firm is superseding the law of 
the state means that the new regime “is not subject to democratic input and 
debate,”99 and that the exercise of power is not “subject to continuing 
rebalancing and checking by the courts.”100 As the importance of private 
rules increases in all aspects of social life, the lack of restraint on the abuse of 
private power threatens the practical ideals of the rule of law.101
The remainder of this Article will canvass three main themes that emerge 
from rule of law discourse: the proposition that governance ought to be 
 Using a rule 
of law framework highlights these tensions and directly confronts the issues 
that arise from private governance.  
                                                                                       
 97. Mark Zuckerberg, Update on Terms, FACEBOOK (Feb. 17, 2009), 
http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=54746167130. 
 98. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 1–3 
(2004). 
 99. Radin, supra note 38, at 6. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Nikolas Rose explains that the dichotomy between public and private exercises of 
power is false and highlights the lack of legal and constitutional restraints on the exercise of 
power: 
The strategies of regulation that have made up our modern experience of 
“power” formulate complex dependencies between the forces and 
institutions deemed “political” and instances, sites and apparatuses which 
shape and manage individual and collective conduct in relation to norms 
and objectives, but yet are constituted as “non-political.” They do not 
have law and constitutionality as their governing principle, but entail 
diverse ways in which legal mechanisms, agents, codes and sanctions are 
called upon and activated in different contexts. The lines between public 
and private, compulsory and voluntary, law and norm operate as internal 
elements within each of these complexes, as each links the regulation of 
public conduct with the subjective emotional and intellectual capacities 
and techniques of individuals, and the ethical regimes through which they 
govern their lives. 
Nikolas S. Rose, Government, Authority and Expertise in Advanced Liberalism, 22 ECON. & SOC’Y 
283, 286–87 (1993). 
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limited by law;102 the liberal emphasis on predictability and formal legality;103 
and the importance placed upon consent and democracy as a source for 
legitimacy in pluralistic communities.104
The extent to which each of these three themes is important is highly 
sensitive to the particular community context. Another recent attempt to 
evaluate the existence of the rule of law within virtual worlds concluded that 
virtual worlds exhibit few of the indicators of the rule of law.
 Each of these themes draws out 
different concerns and tensions about private governance that are somewhat 
difficult to recognize under a classical contractual framework. 
105 This 
framework focused on predictability and formal legality, rule by law, as key 
drivers for business investment in virtual worlds, rather than tackling 
substantive conceptions.106 The normative aspects of the rule of law are more 
difficult to apply to virtual worlds for four main reasons: that games do not 
lend themselves to freedoms; that requirements of democracy and legitimacy 
are difficult to reconcile with provider rule by fiat; that liberty is limited by 
technical constraints as participants are not able to easily leave the 
community; and that “to the extent that the rule of law fosters investment by 
setting expectations, liberal ideals are less important.”107
Concerns about the applicability of substantive rule of law values reflect 
the concerns that virtual communities ought to be able to consensually 
develop in ways that do not reflect liberal values and that, from a business 
perspective, liberal values are less important than a stable framework for the 
enforcement of known rules. This view is correct in that it is difficult to map 
substantive rule of law values for virtual communities, but these issues are 
nonetheless worth examining. That a particular virtual community does not 
embrace certain rule of law values may not be a concern for the territorial 
regulation of virtual communities, but legitimacy is a key issue. The values of 
the rule of law are not universal within virtual communities. The promise of 
diverse communities includes the ability to participate by rule sets that are 
arbitrary, unpredictable, oppressive, or not reflective of liberal, democratic 
values. This promise, however, is conditioned upon the consent of those 
who participate within these spaces.
  
108
                                                                                       
 102. See infra Part 
 Where rule of law values are 
III. 
 103. See infra Part IV. 
 104. See infra Part V. 
 105. Michael Risch, Virtual Rule of Law, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 50 (2009). 
 106. Id. at 12 (discussing “the positive, rather than normative, aspects of the rule of law 
in virtual worlds”). 
 107. Id. at 20–22. 
 108. Id. at 22 (noting that “subscribers democratically choose to have their avatars be 
subject to dictatorial laws”). 
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potentially impugned by community norms, territorial states may use consent 
and legitimacy as a primary indicator of whether or not those norms are 
harmful and, and if so, whether they ought to be constrained. 
In this rule of law analysis, it is not always necessary to identify the 
sovereign source of law with precision. Regulation comes in a number of 
different forms, each of which affects participants.109 Regulation also comes 
from a number of different sources: the moral force of the community, the 
imposed rule of the provider, and the laws of territorial states. Some tensions 
are best illustrated from a position internal to the rules and norms of the 
virtual community, while others are clearer from an external position.110 
There are overlapping constraints from multiple sources, but “[w]hat matters 
is the cumulative effect of the law on its subjects.”111 The interplay between 
internal and external perspectives and sources of regulation constructs the 
experience of participants, who are subject to all these forces at once.112
A final caution is necessary before embarking on a normative account of 
the rule of law and the applicability of these values to virtual communities. It 
is important to remember that the ideals of the rule of law are deeply 
contested and are certainly not universal. This is particularly so for those rule 
of law values that exist primarily as Western liberal ideals, such as the 
emphasis on formality or the set of substantive rights familiar to Western 
constitutionalism.
 This 
Article will proceed on the basis that rule of law values highlight tensions that 
can be located in different sources of regulation in virtual communities and 
provide insights that may be relevant to a number of different forms of 
governance. 
113
                                                                                       
 109. Lessig, The New Chicago School, supra note 
 Much of the argument that follows will proceed from 
12, at 662–63. 
 110. See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357 
(2003) (arguing that the problem of perspective pervades internet law); Jonathon W. Penney, 
Privacy and the New Virtualism, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 194 (2007) (discussing the “new 
virtualism” approach that blends internal and external perspectives to address emerging 
issues in cyberspace regulation); James Grimmelmann, Virtual Borders: The Interdependence of 
Real and Virtual Worlds, 11 FIRST MONDAY (Feb. 2006), available at http://firstmonday.org/-
htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1312/1232 (explaining virtual world 
tensions from internal and external perspectives). 
 111. Risch, supra note 105, at 25. 
 112. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 215. 
 113. There is an argument that the more basic form of the rule of law, as a constraint on 
the exercise of government power, is universal. See TAMANAHA, supra note 98, at 137; 
THOMPSON, supra note 90, at 266. Nevertheless, even this basic limitation cannot be 
universal in the context of virtual communities, where those communities, like some games, 
for which arbitrary governance is part of the appeal, must be protected. See Bartle, supra note 
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the basis of Western liberal understandings of the rule of law and deal with 
the impact that these understandings ought to have on the regulation of 
virtual communities by Western states. This frame unfortunately excludes the 
rapidly developing jurisprudence of many countries that are struggling with 
similar issues, particularly South Korea, whose familiarity with tensions 
arising out of virtual communities in many cases far surpasses that of 
Western countries,114 and for whom the Western liberal ideals of the rule of 
law do not have the same resonance. While the constitutional discourse and 
set of fundamental values may be different, however, future comparative 
work may show very similar struggles around legitimacy that extend beyond 
the Western framework.115
III. GOVERNANCE LIMITED BY LAW 
 
As noted above, the rule of law discourse contains a number of separate 
and contested ideals. One of the primary clusters of values of the rule of law 
requires that governance operates within the limiting framework of the law. 
This means that those in positions of power must abide by the law and that 
the law should only be changed by appropriate procedures within appropriate 
limits.116 It is in this sense that the rule of law has been called a “universal 
human good,” as all societies benefit from restraints on the arbitrary or 
malicious exercise of power.117
Measuring governance within virtual communities against the principles 
of this conception of the rule of law highlights some interesting 
shortcomings in cyberspace self-governance. Most notably, the power of 
providers in virtual communities is not often restrained to acting in 
accordance with the rules. Additionally, however, these values suggest some 
 
                                                                                       
50 (arguing that creators of play spaces sometimes need absolute control over the 
environments in order to make them attractive). 
 114. See particularly the works of Judge Ung-Gi Yoon: Ung-Gi Yoon, A Quest for the 
Legal Identity of MMORPGs—From a Computer Game, Back to a Play Association, 10 J. GAME 
INDUSTRY & CULTURE (2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-
_id=905748; Ung-Gi Yoon, Real Money Trading in MMORPG Items from a Legal and Policy 
Perspective, 1 J. KOR. JUDICATURE 418 (2008) [hereinafter Yoon, Real Money Trading in 
MMORPG].  
 115. See Ung-Gi Yoon, Connecting East and West, Presentation at the State of Play V: 
Building the Global Metaverse Conference (Aug. 20, 2007) (video available at 
http://origin.eastbaymedia.com/embed/player.swf?height=350&width=500&streamer=rtm
p://fms.ebmcdn.net/8004B6/origin.eastbaymedia.com&file=streamer=rtmp://fms.ebmcdn
.net/8004B6/origin.eastbaymedia.com&file=nyls/flash/SOP/03_SOP_DVD_03/SOP_5/2
00807_04.flv). 
 116. TAMANAHA, supra note 98, at 115. 
 117. Id. at 137; THOMPSON, supra note 90, at 266. 
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substantive limits that may be appropriate to impose on virtual governance in 
order to safeguard the interests of participants.  
A. RULE OF LAW LIMITATIONS ON ARBITRARY PUNISHMENT 
The first conception of the rule of law is a prohibition on arbitrary 
governance, a requirement that power is exercised according to the law. This 
was famously set out by A. V. Dicey, whose “first and main articulation”118
[N]o man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body 
or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the 
ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land. In 
this sense the rule of law is contrasted with every system of 
government based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, 
arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint.
 
of the rule of law was: 
119
A limitation on the arbitrary exercise of power immediately raises 
questions about the power of providers in virtual communities. Essentially, 
providers have control over the code that creates the platform, allowing them 
to exercise absolute power within the community itself.
 
120
A provider’s technical ability to alter the virtual landscape is limited by a 
number of sources generalizable to the market, norms, and law.
 Any feature of the 
community can be changed at will by altering the code in some way. A 
provider accordingly has an unlimited technical ability to alter the virtual 
landscape—changing entitlements to virtual property, limiting the ability of 
participants to express themselves or communicate with others, or imposing 
punishments and excluding participants from the community altogether. 
These abilities can be exercised programmatically upon certain defined 
triggering conditions or ad-hoc by the direct intervention of a provider’s 
representative. 
121 If internal 
governance is successful, sufficiently legitimate internal norms will develop to 
respond to the needs of the community.122 Alternatively, should internal 
norms fail, participants may vote with their feet, or wallets, and move to 
another community, thus allowing the market to efficiently regulate.123
                                                                                       
 118. TAMANAHA, supra note 
 
98, at 63. 
 119. DICEY, supra note 1, at 188. 
 120. See Bartle, supra note 50, at 27. 
 121. Lessig, The New Chicago School, supra note 12, at 662–63. 
 122. See David G. Post, Governing Cyberspace: Law, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 883, 911–12 (2007). 
 123. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 30, at 1180–85; Epstein, supra note 14, at 17–18; Post, 
supra note 122, at 170. 
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Assuming, however, that neither of these forces provides a satisfactory 
guarantee, the law is expected to impose some limits on the absolute 
discretion of a provider where appropriate. 
The most immediate legal limits on a provider’s discretion usually lie in 
the contractual terms of service that purport to govern most communities. 
First, providers are expected to act in accordance with the terms of service 
since these contractual documents ought to be enforceable against providers 
and not merely for the benefit of providers.124
Most importantly, terms of service generally include clauses that reserve a 
wide discretion to the provider.
 This leads to some serious 
problems, particularly as most terms of service are drafted in a manner that 
greatly favors the interests of the provider. 
125 In communities where the value of the rule 
of law against arbitrary power is significant, clauses that allow absolute 
discretion should be regarded suspiciously. Take, for example, the Facebook 
Terms of Use, as they were before they were updated due to user protest in 
May 2009.126
[Facebook] may terminate your membership, delete your profile 
and any content or information that you have posted on the 
Site . . . and/or prohibit you from using or accessing the Service or 
the Site . . . for any reason, or no reason, at any time in its sole 
discretion, with or without notice.
 The former terms provided that: 
127
Facebook is an interesting example, as it eventually decided to create less 
harsh terms of service in response to user protest.
 
128
                                                                                       
 124. See Risch, supra note 
 Assuming Facebook had 
not modified its terms, however, this conception of the rule of law may 
suggest that such broad discretionary powers ought to be restrained in 
appropriate cases. If a Facebook subscriber had her account terminated for no 
apparent reason, or for expressing criticism of Facebook, for example, could 
105, at 27–28. 
 125. See Jankowich, supra note 40, at 20. 
 126. Protest over a proposed change to the Facebook Terms of Use led Facebook to 
completely revise its terms in a manner that invites public input. See Zuckerberg, supra note 
97; see also McCarthy, supra note 96 (explaining the controversy created by Facebook’s changed 
terms). 
 127. Facebook Terms of Use, TOSBACK (Feb. 24, 2009), http://www.tosback.org/-
version.php?vid=156 (Sept. 23, 2008 revision). 
 128. It is important to note, however, that under the new terms of service, while 
absolute discretionary power is not explicitly claimed, any award for damages for breach is 
limited so tightly as to effectively close off the threat of contractual breach as a limit on 
discretion. See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, § 15(3) (Oct. 4, 2010), 
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php (limiting damages to the greater of $100 or the 
amount the subscriber has paid Facebook in the last twelve months, which is generally zero). 
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Facebook rely on the broad discretionary clause in the Terms of Service to 
avoid any potential liability? 
The answer, of course, must be: “it depends.” There are competing 
tensions at stake, and it is possible that some communities rely on the ability 
to act arbitrarily and that participants in those communities may not always 
be harmed (at least in a way that ought to be legally recognizable) by the 
exercise of broad discretionary powers.129
Throughout history, this conception of the rule of law has been seen as 
important to help ward off tyrannical governance, and is a project that “will 
never be obsolete.”
 This conception of the rule of law, 
accordingly, does not seem to be universal, at least not with regard to the 
exercise of private virtual governance. However, there may be some 
communities where the existence of such a broad discretionary power is 
harmful to the point where it should be restricted. 
130
B. PROTECTION OF SUBSTANTIVE INTERESTS 
 This concern, if it is accurate, is not likely to dissipate 
simply because the loci of certain governance tensions move online to private 
virtual communities. Thus, the arbitrary or malicious exercise of power by 
the providers and their delegates ought to be cause for concern, at least for 
some communities. In a paradigmatic case, not only will the discretion of a 
provider be limited to that provided under the contract, but a contractual 
clause that claims absolute discretionary power may not be enforceable. To 
the extent that contractual documents are used to govern behavior in virtual 
communities, it is reasonable that providers be similarly bound by the same 
“law,” at least where doing so would not unduly harm the community. 
A requirement that governance be limited by law is somewhat empty if 
there are no substantive limits on the ability to create and modify the law.131
                                                                                       
 129. See Bartle, supra note 
 
It follows for some rule of law theorists that if the exercise of power ought 
to be authorized by law, then the lawmaking power of the government 
50 at 26–27 (explaining the arbitrary powers of some game 
administrators and game rules); see also Vili Lehdonvirta, The Efficient Level of RMT in 
MMORPGs, VIRTUAL ECON. RES. NETWORK (Aug. 23, 2007), http://virtual-
economy.org/blog/the_efficient_level_of_rmt_in_ (arguing that people can react differently 
to varying levels of RMT in online gaming communities). 
 130. TAMANAHA, supra note 98, at 138–39. 
 131. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 225 (2d ed. 
1861) (“[T]he power of a monarch properly so called, or the power of a sovereign number in 
its collegiate and sovereign capacity, is incapable of legal limitation.”); Brian Tierney, “The 
Prince Is Not Bound by the Laws.” Accursius and the Origins of the Modern State, in 5 COMP. STUDS. 
SOC’Y & HIST. 378, 385 (1963) (arguing that “[i]n constitutional states the eliciting of a 
consensus is just as important as the exclusion of caprice”). 
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should be limited over certain subject matter. Historically, these substantive 
limits come from a variety of sources such as natural law, divine law, custom, 
human rights, civil and political rights, and positive instruments like bills of 
rights.132 In this way, “the legality of a person’s treatment, at the hands of the 
state, depends on its being shown to serve a defensible view of the common 
good.”133
Dicey, writing at the turn of the twentieth century, was particularly 
concerned with showing how the constitutional values and rights of English 
citizens were protected by the general law without the need or existence of a 
written constitution.
 The limits on the ability to create rules in virtual communities also 
come from a variety of sources, both legal and non-legal. Focusing only on 
legal limits, the constitutive limits are drawn not only from contract and 
property law but from the sum of all law that can potentially structure the 
relationship between participants and providers.  
134 While Dicey recognized that whether substantive 
rights were protected under a written constitution or by the common law was 
“a merely formal difference,”135 he argued that the English approach was 
more useful than that of the French Constitution because it focused on 
remedies available to enforce rights rather than potentially empty declarations 
of the existence of rights.136 Accordingly, values such as individual liberty, 
property, and freedom of speech are all protected by the operation of general 
law.137 For example, “the right to express one’s opinion on all matters,” is 
protected by the common law, “subject to the liability to pay compensation 
for libellous or to suffer punishment for seditious or blasphemous 
statements.”138
Dicey’s approach is of some assistance because there is no written 
constitution that governs virtual communities.
 
139 Assuming that public values 
are being displaced by private governance regimes,140
                                                                                       
 132. TAMANAHA, supra note 
 then it may be desirable 
98, at 118–19 (explaining that the applicable limits on 
legislative power come from a number of sources, but that “[t]he key . . . is simply a 
pervasive belief, on the part of the populace and officials,” that such limits exist). 
 133. ALLAN, supra note 85, at 2. 
 134. DICEY, supra note 1, at 187–88. 
 135. Id. at 198. 
 136. Id. at 198–99. 
 137. Id. at 201–02. 
 138. Id. at 201. 
 139. Raph Koster proposed a hypothetical Bill of Rights as a thought experiment in 
2000. See Raph Koster, Declaring the Rights of Players (Aug. 7, 2000), http://www.raph-
koster.com/gaming/playerrights.shtml (including A Declaration of the Rights of Avatars). 
 140. See Radin, supra note 38. 
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to address these concerns by ensuring that public values are read into the 
private law doctrines that regulate private governance.  
Evolved as they have in the paradigm of freedom to contract and the 
sovereignty of private property, private contract and property doctrines do 
not currently reflect the needs or desires of participants in virtual 
communities. As a result, participants in virtual communities are unable to 
frame their interests in a manner that is recognizable in the legal system. As 
more cases are brought where participants seek to assert substantive rights, 
however, reading protection for certain interests into the regulatory 
framework of virtual communities may help to reduce the alienating effect of 
using private law rules to govern those communities.  
Take, for example, the case of Peter Ludlow, who wrote a virtual 
newspaper called The Alphaville Herald about events in Electronic Arts’ 
(“EA”) virtual world, The Sims Online. Ludlow wrote some scathing 
commentary about EA’s management and the lack of an appropriate 
response to “cyber-prostitution,” and posted the story on an external 
website. After he posted a link to The Alphaville Herald on his in-world profile, 
EA subsequently ejected him from The Sims for a technical breach of the 
rules, which prohibit linking to external sites.141
This abstraction requires that Ludlow frame his concern in terms of a 
contractual argument, rather than being able to express his true concerns: 
that participants in a community ought to be able to express their 
dissatisfaction about how the community is governed. As critical legal 
scholars recognized, the imposition of reified legal categories alienates the 
real needs and desires of citizens by presenting legal abstractions rather than 
the underlying tensions.
 Ludlow’s concerns are free 
speech concerns. Viewed as a purely contractual dispute, however, the core 
issue here, the free speech argument, is not legally recognizable. The abstract 
way in which the legal system construes contractual disputes means that EA 
had absolute discretion in determining whether to accept Ludlow’s breach of 
the Terms of Service or to terminate Ludlow’s account. 
142
                                                                                       
 141. PETER LUDLOW & MARK WALLACE, THE SECOND LIFE HERALD: THE VIRTUAL 
TABLOID THAT WITNESSED THE DAWN OF THE METAVERSE 145–48 (2007). 
 A better answer recognizes that contractual 
doctrine has a constitutive effect and that the limits imposed on the exercise 
 142. See Peter Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, 3 RES. L. & SOC. 25, 30–32 (1980) 
(discussing the abstraction of fact situations in the first stage of legal decision making); Mark 
Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591 (1980) 
(arguing that under-analyzed choices made at the interpretive stage in legal arguments 
substantially affect the rational resolution of disputes). 
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of a technical right to terminate shape the boundaries of acceptable 
governance within the virtual community.  
This is not to say that the process is in any way determinative. EA’s 
interest in protecting the image and reputation of the community, and the 
value of its subscription fees, may outweigh any interest that Ludlow has in 
expressing his concerns about the in-world governance structures. At least, 
however, this conclusion will be reached with full knowledge of the values 
that are at stake, rather than ignoring the underlying tensions through the 
rote application of abstract doctrine. By expanding the frame of reference 
and considering the effects and by explicitly reading substantive values into 
legal doctrine, more appropriate outcomes can be achieved.  
The Ludlow example shows that the task of confronting and evaluating 
substantive governance values is a fundamentally pragmatic exercise. 
Jettisoning universal natural law principles in favor of the subjectivity of 
value systems leaves the familiar liberal autonomy problem: the great 
difficulty of determining appropriate substantive normative limits in a 
pluralistic society. Several theorists have attempted to suggest some 
appropriate starting points by addressing the particular tensions that they 
perceive in cyberspace self-rule. One approach introduces “blanket non-
waivability for certain well-defined exceptional categories of entitlements”143 
in order to allow a general regime of private bargaining to operate. As a 
“preliminary pass” to identifying some potential exceptions, this approach 
suggests “three categories for our attention: (1) rights related to legal 
enforcement; (2) human rights; [and] (3) rights that are politically weak.”144 
Other theorists suggest different sets of substantive limits such as: the free 
speech rights of developers and players;145 the encouragement of liberal 
democratic association;146 property rights, personal and dignitary interests, 
and limiting fraud;147 and anti-competitive barriers that would hinder the 
development of a marketplace of norms.148
These are some of the governance values that form the substantive 
constitutional limits on the exercise of government power in Western 
democracies. Raph Koster drew many of these together as a thought 
experiment in 2000, when he proposed a hypothetical Declaration of the Rights 
  
                                                                                       
 143. Radin, supra note 38, at 149–50. 
 144. Id. at 150. 
 145. Balkin, supra note 28. 
 146. See Netanel, supra note 19, at 455. 
 147. Fairfield, supra note 55, at 468. 
 148. Epstein, supra note 14, at 819. 
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of Avatars,149 modelled on the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen150 and the U.S. Bill of Rights.151 Several substantive rights are claimed 
for participants in virtual communities, including equality,152 “liberty, 
property, security, . . . resistance to oppression,”153 the right to contribute to 
the shaping of the internal rules,154 freedom of speech,155 freedom of 
assembly,156 and privacy.157 While certainly not exhaustive or authoritative, 
Koster’s list illustrates the range of substantive issues that, for various 
reasons, certain societies prohibit their citizens from opting out of, or at least 
enforce higher than normal thresholds of consent for their modification.158
It is important to avoid a substantive construction of the rule of law that 
is so broad that it loses its potency.
  
159
In the remainder of this Part, four core groups of substantive interests 
are examined: the interests that revolve around speech, discrimination, and 
protest; the recognition of property rights; the right to privacy; and the rights 
 While many of these constitutional 
values fit within a rule of law framework because they are said to be 
prerequisites for legitimate governance, there is no easy claim to universality. 
These are some of the values that constrain the autonomy of governance in 
Western liberal democracies, but in working through the list provided by 
Koster and the concerns raised by other theorists, it is evident that the 
application of any substantive values as limits to autonomy is heavily context-
dependent. The type and extent of desirable substantive limits is, accordingly, 
likely to differ by territorial state, community, and time.  
                                                                                       
 149. Koster, supra note 139. Balkin reminds us that “the rights at stake are not really the 
rights of the avatars themselves. They are the rights of the players who take on particular 
(and possibly multiple) identities within the virtual communities.” Balkin, supra note 28, at 
2083. 
 150. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND THE CITIZEN (Fr. 1789), translated in 
The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History, and Diplomacy, YALE LAW SCHOOL—LILLIAN 
GOLDMAN LAW LIBRARY, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2010). 
 151. U.S. CONST. amends. I–X.  
 152. Koster, supra note 139, at art. 1. 
 153. Id. at art. 2. 
 154. Id. at art. 6. 
 155. Id. at art. 11. 
 156. Id. at art. 17. 
 157. Id. at art. 18. 
 158. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1986) 
(discussing partial inalienability as a method to restrain harmful commodification but 
simultaneously allow beneficial trades or avoid causing further harm). 
 159. TAMANAHA, supra note 98, at 113 (“The rule of law cannot be about everything 
good that people desire from government. The persistent temptation to read it this way is a 
testament to the symbolic power of the rule of law, but it should not be indulged.”). 
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of legal enforcement. These limits are examples of the types of limits that 
states may choose to impose on autonomy in virtual communities and have 
attracted substantial academic interest. This list represents some of the core 
values that are important to western liberal conceptions of the rule of law. It 
cannot be either universal or exhaustive, but it is useful in providing an 
overview of how such interests can be thought of as constitutive limits to 
cyberspace self-governance and how malleable any such approach must be in 
order to take into account conflicting social interests. 
1. Freedom of  Expression Concerns: Discrimination, Speech, and Protest 
Anti-discrimination law provides a useful example in highlighting the way 
in which a legislated protection of certain interests can shape the internal 
rules of a community. It also provides an example of the tailoring that occurs 
in trading off potential harms against the benefits of allowing communities 
some degree of autonomy. Take two examples of sexual discrimination in 
virtual communities: Blizzard threatening Sara Andrews with disconnection 
from World of Warcraft160 for advertising a LGBT-friendly guild,161 and 
Microsoft banning Xbox Live162 players whose names included the word 
“gay.”163
                                                                                       
 160. World of Warcraft is an extremely successful massively multiplayer online roleplaying 
game (“MMORPG”) by Blizzard Entertainment. Blizzard reports that the game currently 
has over twelve million active subscribers. See Press Release, Blizzard Entm’t, World Of 
Warcraft Subscriber Base Reaches 12 Million Worldwide (Oct. 7, 2010), 
http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/company/press/pressreleases.html?101007. But see Daeity, 
Blizzard’s “Active Subscriptions” vs “Real Players,” DIGITAL CASTRATION (Aug. 9, 2010), 
http://daeity.blogspot.com/2010/08/blizzards-active-subscription-numbers.html (arguing 
that the active subscriber figure is inflated due to Blizzard’s practice of banning 
approximately 100,000 accounts per month). 
 Both of these examples highlight reactions by some participants to 
communities that they find somewhat threatening—in these cases, 
 161. Brian Ashcraft, Blizzard’s Reaction to Gay Guilds an “Unfortunate Mistake,” KOTAKU 
(Mar. 9, 2006, 5:24 PM), http://kotaku.com/159536/blizzards-reaction-to-gay-guilds-an-
unfortunate-mistake; Mark Ward, Gay Rights Win in Warcraft World, BBC NEWS (Feb. 13, 
2006, 8:42 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4700754.stm. 
 162. Xbox Live is Microsoft’s online gaming service. Microsoft claims the service 
reached twenty-three million subscribers in February 2010. See Marc Whitten, An Open Letter 
from Xbox LIVE General Manager Marc Whitten, XBOX.COM (Feb. 5, 2010), 
http://www.xbox.com/en-US/press/2010/0205-whittenletter.htm. 
 163. Luke Plunkett, Xbox Live “Gay” Crackdown MIGHT Be Getting A Little Out Of Hand, 
KOTAKU (May 21, 2008), http://kotaku.com/392304/xbox-live-gay-crackdown-might-be-
getting-a-little-out-of-hand; Jay Slatkin, “Gay” Player Name Banned By Xbox Live, 
CONSUMERIST (May 14, 2008), http://consumerist.com/5008908/gay-player-name-banned-
by-xbox-live. 
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prominent homophobia from other participants.164 In order to minimize 
perceived conflict, the provider has in each case threatened to ban minority 
group participants for overtly expressing their sexuality in a way that could 
trigger negative reactions from other participants.165
Under the Terms of Service, both Blizzard and Microsoft reserve a broad 
right to terminate access to participants.
 
166 These contractual clauses may, 
however, come into conflict with anti-discrimination laws.167 Many territorial 
states already provide limits on discrimination for sexual orientation within 
private groups.168 In the United States, anti-discrimination laws generally 
prohibit discrimination on protected grounds in “places of public 
accommodation.”169 To date, courts have been reluctant to find that online 
communities are “places of public accommodation.”170
                                                                                       
 164. See Justin Cole, Op/Ed: The Impact Of Homophobia in Virtual Communities, KOTAKU 
(July 11, 2009), http://www.kotaku.com.au/2009/07/oped-the-impact-of-homophobia-in-
virtual-communities/ (arguing that virtual communities express a widespread, normalized 
homophobia). 
 As the importance of 
 165. See Sara Andrews, Posting to World of Warcraft Not Gaymer Friendly, GAMERS 
EXPERIMENTATIONS (Jan. 16, 2006, 6:12 PM), http://web.archive.org/web/-
20060221231447/http://gamers.experimentations.org/forums/index.php?showtopic=6852 
(Internet Archive copy); MS XBL Gay Equals Sex?, LESBIAN GAMERS (May 23, 2008), 
http://lesbiangamers.com/2008/05/ms-xbl-gay-equals-sex/; PixelPoet, Xbox Live Gaywood 
Drama Update Gay Gamer, GAYGAMER (2008), http://gaygamer.net/2008/05/-
xbox_live_gaywood_drama_update.html.  
 166. See World of Warcraft: Terms of Use Agreement, WORLD OF WARCRAFT.COM, § 6 (Oct. 
29, 2010), http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/legal/termsofuse.html (“BLIZZARD MAY 
SUSPEND, TERMINATE, MODIFY, OR DELETE ANY BNET ACCOUNT OR 
WORLD OF WARCRAFT ACCOUNT AT ANY TIME FOR ANY REASON OR FOR 
NO REASON, WITH OR WITHOUT NOTICE TO YOU.”); Xbox LIVE and Games for 
Windows LIVE Terms of Use, XBOX.COM, § 16 (Oct. 2010), http://www.xbox.com/en-
us/legal/livetou.htm (“We may cancel or suspend your Service at any time. Our cancellation 
or suspension may be without cause and without notice.”). 
 167. Dagmar Schiek, Freedom of Contract and a Non-Discrimination Principle: Irreconcilable 
Antonyms?, in NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 85–88 (Titia 
Loenen & Peter Rodrigues eds., 1999) (arguing for non-discrimination as a general principle 
of contract law).  
 168. Id. at 77–78. 
 169. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2006) (defining public accommodations for the 
purpose of the 1964 Civil Rights Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2006) (defining public 
accommodations for the purposes of the Americans With Disabilities Act). 
 170. See Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 544 (E.D. Va. 2004), 
aff’d, No. 03-1770, 2004 WL 602711 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2004) (holding that because they lack 
physicality, “AOL’s online chat rooms cannot be construed as ‘places of public 
accommodation’ ” for the purposes of the Americans With Disabilities Act); In 
Chambers — Court Order, Stern v. Sony Corp., No. 09-CV-7710 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010), 
ECF No. 18, available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/28950515/Stern-v-Sony-MTD-Order 
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participation in online communities increases, however, the significance of 
being excluded on an unacceptable basis similarly becomes greater; if 
extended, such laws could prevent providers from discriminating as to who 
can join and remain in a community.171
The law in this area continues to develop. It seems likely that some form 
of rights to non-discriminatory access will be recognized in the future, at least 
for some communities, particularly those that have a more public character. 
In developing these rules, courts and legislatures should be particularly 
mindful of when certain forms of discrimination are tolerable for specific 
purposes and when such behavior crosses the line into impermissible 
discrimination or even vilification. Some level of discrimination is often 
beneficial where that discrimination goes to the heart of the community’s 
purpose.
 To the extent that these rules are 
effective, they become constitutive limits by limiting the ways in which 
communities and groups can choose to discriminate.  
172
This principle holds for other potential substantive limits; the relative 
importance of social values is contingent on the purpose and use of the 
community. For example, the importance placed on freedom of speech of 
participants needs to be weighed against the speech interests of the providers 
in virtual communities.
 The proper evaluation of whether discrimination is desirable 
must be determined by a thorough examination of the circumstances and 
social structure of the particular community. 
173
                                                                                       
(holding that Sony’s online games were not “places of public accommodation” for the 
purposes of the ADA). 
 These freedoms can conflict at times and the 
developer’s free speech rights to create an expressive game or other platform 
may outweigh any concerns about the legitimate interests of participants. 
 171. See Balkin, supra note 28, at 2084–85; Colin Crawford, Cyberplace: Defining a Right to 
Internet Access Through Public Accommodation Law, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 225 (2003) (arguing that 
rules of public accommodation ought to be extended to virtual communities); Netanel, supra 
note 19, at 456 (arguing that “Cyberfora and networks that are generally open to the public 
should similarly be seen as ‘places of public accommodation,’ whether by statutory 
construction or legislative extension”); Joshua Newton, Virtually Enabled: How Title III of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act Might Be Applied to Online Virtual Worlds, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 183 
(2010) (arguing that virtual worlds should be treated as places of public accommodation and 
analyzed separately from websites).  
 172. Netanel argues that discrimination should be acceptable in circumstances where it 
is necessary in order to conduce meaningful and effective expression: “Some conversations 
lose their essential purpose and meaning unless limited to persons of a particular group. In 
such instances, the participants’ interest in discriminating (and the allied public interest in 
promoting discursive expression and association) should prevail over the interest in 
preventing invidious status discrimination.” Netanel, supra note 19, at 459–60. 
 173. Balkin, supra note 28.  
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However, sometimes the free speech rights of individual participants may be 
so important as to warrant regulatory protection.174
The private nature of virtual communities, by placing the power to 
regulate speech in the hands of private property owners, has the capacity to 
significantly interfere with the liberty of individual citizens, particularly as 
online fora become more important to expression.
 
175 A purely negative 
reading of the First Amendment that does not extend in any way to private 
restrictions on speech in virtual communities substantially undercuts the 
protection historically afforded to speech, as there are few virtual spaces 
analogous to the protected corporeal public forums that exist to provide a 
platform for citizens to speak or be heard freely.176 Harm can occur where a 
provider has absolute discretion over the content of communications within 
a virtual community, thus leading to a suggestion that at least for the more 
“public” types of communities, territorial states may have a legitimate interest 
in limiting the ability of the provider to regulate participant speech.177
While it certainly seems desirable to protect participant speech, there is a 
significant difficulty in determining when private restraints on speech ought 
to be acceptable and when they should not. Limits on private restraints could 
be considered justified in “[i]nternet forums that are generally open to the 
public for free speech purposes,”
 
178 but this standard excludes the majority of 
virtual communities, which generally do not explicitly hold themselves out as 
free speech zones. Other approaches, on the other hand, suggest that 
regulatory boundaries can be drawn along the distinctions between 
commodified and non-commodified communities and the distinction 
between communities that encourage the free exchange of ideas and those 
that are developed to “realize the artistic or ideological vision of the platform 
owner.”179
Regulating the platform owner’s right to design in order to protect 
the participants’ right to play is most justifiable when the virtual 
world serves as a public space for commerce, and when it is held 
open as a public space for the exchange of ideas. These two 
distinctions may not be perfectly clear in all cases; but they point 
 Balkin sets up a tension between state regulation and the free 
speech interests of virtual community providers, arguing that: 
                                                                                       
 174. Id. at 2084. 
 175. Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1115, 1121–23 (2005). 
 176. Id. at 1117–18. 
 177. Balkin, supra note 28, at 2090; Nunziato, supra note 175, at 1161, 1167. 
 178. Nunziato, supra note 175, at 1166. 
 179. Balkin, supra note 28, at 2090. 
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the way to the boundaries of permissible state regulation on the 
one hand, and the free speech rights of platform owners on the 
other.180
Accordingly, free speech interests of participants will be most important 
to recognize in virtual communities that act like a marketplace, and secondly, 
in communities that are “offered as a space for the free exchange of ideas.”
 
181
The example of Peter Ludlow’s exile from The Sims Online highlights that 
any claim must be evaluated on the purposes for which the community was 
created and the way it was used.
 
182 This seems to be fundamentally correct; 
no two communities can be treated alike,183 and the free speech interests of 
participants need to be weighed against the free speech interests of the 
providers.184
In weighing the competing speech interests of providers and participants, 
it is desirable to avoid a strict dichotomy between communities that are, or 
are held out to be, free speech zones and those that are not. Such a 
distinction is likely to allow the majority of providers to exclude themselves 
from potential responsibility by simply disclaiming any participant interests. 
It is much more desirable to examine whether particular limits are 
appropriate for particular communities than to attempt a blanket 
determination of whether or not a community is exempt from all speech 
responsibilities. So, for example, EA could be required to tolerate an external 
link to a news article that is critical of its governance procedures but not an 
external link that exposes their users to unsolicited commercial 
communications. The purpose and use of a community will always be 
relevant to the types of speech restrictions that territorial states may consider 
appropriate for the provider to impose. If such speech concerns are serious 
enough to warrant territorial intervention, it is desirable to adopt a more 
subtle and critical method of evaluation, rather than attempting to rely on a 
binary classification of a community as either allowing free communication 
or not. 
 Nevertheless, in appropriate cases, providers may incur some 
responsibilities to allow dissenting voices, a claim that is somewhat stronger 
in more general use platforms. 
The analysis becomes more complicated if, in addition to the competing 
speech interests, the interests of the provider in the stability of the servers or 
                                                                                       
 180. Id.  
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. at 2093. 
 183. Id. at 2084. 
 184. Id. at 2080. 
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network are considered. The interests of participants to peaceful assembly 
and protest,185 for example, can sometimes directly conflict with the ability of 
other participants to enjoy the community and the interests of the provider 
in maintaining order and community uptime. The task of managing 
participants is a very complicated exercise for a provider, on which the fate 
of the entire community often rests.186 Participants have a very large range of 
different motivations and interests in the community, and they contribute to 
the community in many ways. Passionate participants will often manifest 
their displeasure and, just as displeased citizens in territorial states, will seek 
to make their voices heard within the community. Virtual worlds have 
provided fertile platforms for protests over at least the last decade, with some 
protests about issues specific to the community and others that reflect 
external political struggles.187
Individual or small-scale manifestations of dissent are speech concerns, 
but larger scale virtual protests raise interesting new tensions. Protests are 
often disruptive by their nature and design, and this is no different in virtual 
communities. The presence of a large number of people protesting in a 
virtual world, for example, can potentially prevent others from enjoying the 
world and can strain the platform.
  
188
By relying on a clause in the terms of service that prohibits disruptive 
behavior, providers may respond to protests by threatening to disconnect, 
suspend, or ban users if they do not disband. If a provider could be required 
to tolerate dissenting speech from individual subscribers, could it also be 
 The concentrated presence of a large 
number of participants in a small area can sometimes impose a severe load 
on the provider’s network and software, which is sufficient to crash the 
platform and disable the community for a few hours. In addition to other 
reasons for suppressing dissent, providers accordingly often have a technical 
incentive to disband in-world protests.  
                                                                                       
 185. See ALLAN, supra note 85, at 93–94 (arguing that the rule of law requires freedom to 
protest against injustice); Locke, supra note 88, § 149 (discussing the fundamental power of 
citizens to replace the government); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 76 (1863) (discussing 
the necessity of freedom of opinion). 
 186. See John Banks, Co-Creative Expertise: Auran Games and Fury—A Case Study, 130 
MEDIA INT’L AUSTL. 77 (2009) (highlighting the different interests of distinct player groups 
and developers that shape the development of computer games and their commercial 
success). 
 187. See Bridget M. Blodgett, And the Ringleaders Were Banned: An Examination of Protest in 
Virtual Worlds, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
COMMUNITIES AND TECHNOLOGIES 135, 135–36 (2009). 
 188. See, e.g., id. at 143 (providing examples of protests that resulted in strained 
platforms). 
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required to permit disruptive dissent that threatens the stability of the servers 
and the enjoyment of other members of the community? The tensions at 
play here are not only those involving speech, but also the provider’s interest 
in the functioning of the platform and in maintaining a harmonious 
community. 
2. Property Rights 
Many of the speech tensions above are also reflected in the continuing 
debate about the ownership of virtual objects. In communities where 
participants are able to create or acquire virtual objects, participants may feel 
a sense of entitlement to those virtual objects.189 There may be no descriptive 
or normative impediment to recognizing such virtual objects as legal property 
because not only are virtual objects indistinguishable from real world 
property interests, but the theoretical justifications for recognizing excludable 
property rights can be extended to virtual environments.190
One model of virtual property argues that one of the most significant 
sources of substantive limits on self-governance ought to come from 
property law.
  
191 Where participants create or acquire virtual property, the law 
may come to recognize their interests as the owner of that property.192 
Property rights recognized in this manner would impose limits on the ability 
of providers to unilaterally exercise power over participants. The Bragg case, 
where Marc Bragg sued Linden Lab for terminating his Second Life account 
and confiscating his virtual property, provides an example of possible 
limits.193
Setting aside the circumstances of the dispute for the moment, it is 
arguable that “[b]ecause courts have not defined the relationship between 
EULAs and virtual property, the parties were not able to clearly articulate the 
deal they wished to make.”
 Linden alleged that Bragg cheated by purchasing land that was not 
technically for sale, at significantly under market value. Bragg maintained that 
he did not cheat and that, at any rate, the punishment was excessive, as it 
extended beyond the contested land to the remainder of his virtual assets. 
194
                                                                                       
 189. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 
 If Bragg’s property rights in his virtual land, 
objects, and Linden Dollars were recognized, Linden Lab would be unable to 
15, at 37. 
 190. Id. at 49–50. 
 191. See generally Fairfield, supra note 52 (arguing that property rights can help to better 
structure the vertical relationship between participants and providers). 
 192. Fairfield limits his argument to virtual assets that are rivalrous, persistent, and 
interconnected. See id. at 1053. 
 193. Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 194. Fairfield, supra note 52, at 465. 
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unilaterally terminate his account without being required to pay 
compensation—or at least, the parties would be able to negotiate over 
appropriate rule sets.195
Some version of property rights ought to be recognized within Second Life 
in particular. The “virtual” economy in Second Life is fluidly convertible to 
“real” currencies, like the U.S. dollar, and participants feel a sense of 
entitlement to their virtual property and currency. Linden Lab clearly 
encourages this behavior; its slogan is “Your world. Your imagination,” and 
its promotional materials refer to the possibility of “owning” virtual land and 
generally stresses the liquidity of the market.
  
196
[O]ur new policy recognizes the fact that persistent world users are 
making significant contributions to building these worlds and 
should be able to both own the content they create and share in the 
value that is created. The preservation of users’ property rights is a 
necessary step toward the emergence of genuinely real online 
worlds.
 Linden Lab encourages 
investment in virtual resources and substantially profits from that investment. 
In a press release announcing changes to the Terms of Service that vested 
intellectual property rights of in-world creations in subscribers, Linden 
claimed: 
197
Judge Robreno, in the Bragg case, noted this press release and other hype 
about the ownership of virtual property and land in Second Life and quoted 
the CEO of Linden Lab as boasting that “[t]he idea of land ownership and 
the ease with which you can own land and do something with it . . . is 
intoxicating. . . . Land ownership feels important and tangible. It’s a real piece 
of the future.”
 
198
Given these and other comments, it is hardly surprising that a participant 
such as Bragg would feel aggrieved if Linden Lab were to confiscate his 
virtual property and wealth. If a similar case were to proceed to final 
 
                                                                                       
 195. Id. at 465.  
 196. At least until August 22, 2008, Linden Lab proudly proclaimed that residents could 
“Own Virtual Land” as part of the marketing material on their website. The page has since 
been removed. Own Virtual Land Second Life, LINDEN LAB, http://web.archive.org/web/-
20080822144829/http://secondlife.com/whatis/land.php (Internet Archive copy). 
 197. Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 596 (quoting Press Release, Linden Lab, Second Life 
Residents To Own Digital Creations: Linden Lab Preserves Real World Intellectual Property 
Rights of Users of its Second Life Online Service (Nov. 14, 2003), available at 
http://lindenlab.com/pressroom/releases/03_11_14).  
 198. Id. at 596 (quoting Philip Rosedale in Michael Learmonth, Virtual Real Estate Boom 
Draws Real Dollars, USA TODAY, June 3, 2004).  
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judgment,199 it would not be difficult for a court to recognize that Linden 
Lab created an environment where participants derive some form of 
property rights in their virtual assets. While the appropriate scope of virtual 
property rights is not clear, they could prevent Linden Lab from destroying 
the property, or at least the value of the virtual property, whose creation 
Linden Lab encouraged.200
This principle, however, is not necessarily extendible to other 
environments. It is possible that a fantasy environment can be created where 
virtual objects exist and are possessed by participants but no legal property 
rights should be enforceable.
  
201 Because virtual communities are diverse, 
creating property rights may not be justified in every community. Not every 
instance of virtual property should be recognized as legal property, and there 
may be many valid reasons why both participants and providers would not 
benefit from the recognition of property rights.202 The unfettered ability of 
the provider to control the community, including the ability to expel a 
participant and destroy her property, can be fundamentally necessary in order 
to create a community that is interesting, fun, or useful to its participants.203
Here, too, some distinctions based upon the level of commodification 
and purpose of a community may be useful.
 
Accordingly, there is a fundamental tension between the interests of 
participants in having a protected entitlement to what they see as their 
property and the ability of providers to regulate and develop the community. 
204
                                                                                       
 199. The Bragg case settled on undisclosed terms after the decision in Bragg. 487 F. Supp. 
2d 593. 
 Perhaps, the more 
commodified a virtual community is and the more the provider encourages 
 200. BENJAMIN DURANSKE, VIRTUAL LAW: NAVIGATING THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF 
VIRTUAL WORLDS 39–40 (2008). 
 201. Nevertheless, Fairfield argues that property rights should be recognized first and 
that communal ownership schemes can be created on top of these rights: “[A]n overarching 
system of private property does permit communal property groups to continue to exist, if 
the community is able to make its social controls stick. The contrary is not true: the 
elimination of private property leaves, by definition, no room for private property.” See 
Fairfield, supra note 52, at 1101. 
 202. See Bartle, supra note 50, at 35–37 (arguing that administrators of game worlds need 
absolute power to prevent commodification in order to protect the game conceit); see also 
Lehdonvirta, supra note 129 (arguing that there are positive and negative effects of allowing 
trade in virtual goods which vary depending on the community). 
 203. Bartle, supra note 50, at 26–27. Balkin gives the example of The Gulag Online, a 
fictional game where participants experience a simulation of a Soviet-era prison camp; 
participants could not, in such a simulation, assert any virtual property or due process rights. 
See Jack M. Balkin, Law and Liberty in Virtual Worlds, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 65 (2004). 
 204. Balkin, supra note 28, at 2090 (arguing that worlds that are more commodified 
should be subject to higher regulation to protect speech). 
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the creation and trade in virtual property, then the more likely it is that 
property rights in the virtual property ought to be enforceable. On the other 
hand, the more the provider is successful in genuine efforts to avoid 
commodification and the less porous the borders are in allowing real money 
trades, the more acceptable the provider’s argument that the virtual property 
and virtual currency should not create real world entitlements. This approach 
allows for a more subtle and tailored examination of property interests. For 
the types of communities where the developer requires absolute control, and 
the participants understand this need, then enforceable property rights may 
have little relevance. Where participants have come to expect a sense of 
stability in their virtual possessions, however, the absolute ability of the 
provider to destroy those possessions may need to be curtailed. 
One objection to this distinction is that it predicates property interests 
primarily on corporeal exchange value, ignoring, to an extent, the personal 
attachment that participants may develop to their virtual possessions and 
creations. The rise of user-generated content provides a prime example. 
There is an increasing trend in software development to create a bare 
platform and encourage the participants to create the assets—the objects and 
landscape that define the virtual environment.205 Even where this content is 
not commodified, participants attach particular value to their creations and 
possessions and may accordingly be entitled to some form of legal 
recognition for that attachment, either as the objects of their labor206 or as 
manifestations and expressions of their selves.207
Recognizing the interests of participants in virtual goods or expression 
may not necessarily require recognizing fully excludable property rights. 
There may be other approaches that are more suitable to dealing with the 
complex relationship between participants and providers. For example, 
recognizing participants’ property interests in virtual items could be 
analogous to goodwill, which allows providers to modify environments while 
  
                                                                                       
 205. See John Banks & Sal Humphreys, The Labour of User Co-Creators: Emergent Social 
Network Markets?, 14 CONVERGENCE 401, 402 (2008). 
 206. See Locke, supra note 88, § 31. 
 207. See GEORGE WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
RIGHT 39, 41, 43 (Allen W. Wood ed., Hugh Barr Nisbet trans., 1991); see also Neil Netanel, 
Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental 
Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 20 (1994) (discussing the influence of 
Kantian’s and Hegelian’s perspectives on authorship on continental intellectual property 
law). 
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giving some level of security to participants.208 In other circumstances, 
particularly where participants are contributing heavily to the value of the 
platform by creating content, there may be a real harm when participants are 
directly brought into the value chain and are thereafter treated unfairly by the 
provider. For example, unjust enrichment could be an appropriate remedy or, 
in jurisdictions where they are available, moral rights of attribution and 
integrity for virtual creations may be enforced. Possibly the most useful 
approach would be rooted in contractual doctrine and its limitations on the 
exercise of discretionary powers, such as the requirement of good faith.209 If 
these remedies prove unsuitable or inappropriate, it may be possible to 
recognize new interests that prevent a participant from being alienated from 
her creations, as would happen when a provider terminates a participant’s 
access to a community but continues to use her in-world assets. There may 
even be situations where it would be desirable to allow a participant-author 
to enforce a right akin to the French moral right of withdrawal, allowing her 
to prohibit further uses of the material she creates after she has left a 
community.210
Fundamentally there is unlikely to be a single solution that addresses 
property-type interests in virtual communities. The level of protection that a 
participant ought to be entitled to, if any, will be highly dependent on the 
particular circumstances of the community. The recognition of property 
rights may be detrimental in some communities, particularly where it would 
be prohibitively expensive for the community to develop comprehensive 
procedures to regulate property disputes or in a community where limiting 
the discretion of the provider to deal with virtual assets would greatly 
undermine the value and essential qualities of the community. Nevertheless, 
territorial states have a legitimate interest in articulating a set of entitlements 
that participants in particular types of virtual communities have in their 
virtual items or creations and in limiting the corresponding autonomy of 
  
                                                                                       
 208. In this conception, a trade does not transfer title to the virtual object itself, but to 
the value of the participant's labor in obtaining the object. See generally Ung-Gi Yoon, Real 
Money Trading in MMORPG, supra note 114. 
 209. See, e.g., Dan E. Lawrence, It Really Is Just a Game: The Impracticability of Common Law 
Property Rights in Virtual Property, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 505, 529–30 (2008) (arguing that “Bragg 
demonstrates that contract law, even in the absence of independent property rights in virtual 
property, can provide a remedy for an end-user wrongfully deprived of virtual property”); 
Michael Meehan, Virtual Property: Protecting Bits in Context, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 7, ¶¶ 57–60 
(2006) (discussing the potential applicability of good faith to restrain providers from 
devaluing virtual property). 
 210. The French right of withdrawal is subject to payment of compensation to the user 
of the work for any harm caused by its exercise. See CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ 
INTELLECTUELLE [C. PROP. INTELL.] art. L121-4 (Fr.). 
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providers to destroy or modify those entitlements. Enforceable interests in 
virtual property, seen in this way, act as substantive constitutive restrictions 
on the scope of cyberspace self-governance.  
3. Right to Privacy 
The potential threats that the use of networked technologies pose to the 
privacy of participants has been the subject of much discussion in recent 
decades. The growing importance of participation and the increasing 
computational power and storage capacity of computer networks highlights 
immediate concerns about the collection, use, and distribution of personal 
information. Because all actions that occur “within” a virtual community are 
essentially reduced to information flows, they are all easily recorded and 
stored. Actions that are ephemeral in the corporeal world perversely take on 
a more tangible form when mediated through virtual information networks. 
Information that is not displayed or carried out synchronously must 
necessarily be processed and stored for later use; personal messages left on 
bulletin boards and profile pages are kept indefinitely on the provider’s 
server, for example. Even information that is used synchronously, however, 
is vulnerable to capture, including all actions, searches, information and 
products browsed, real-time chats, and exchanges between participants are 
potentially logged and stored.211
The data collected presents a treasure chest of potentially valuable 
information if it can be analyzed and repurposed in sufficiently innovative 
ways. Amazon, for example, has built a very successful business model by 
collating the browsing and purchasing habits of its customers in order to 
deliver targeted advertising and product recommendations.
 
212 When Facebook 
decided to implement a similar system, called Beacon, that would advertise a 
user’s purchases on certain partner sites to other people in the user’s social 
network, it was quickly met with outrage from Facebook users.213
                                                                                       
 211. For example, Sony Online Entertainment has recently granted researchers access to 
several terrabytes of data, representing the entire collected actions of 400,000 players in 
Everquest 2 over a four-year period. John Timmer, Science Gleans 60TB of Behavior Data from 
Everquest 2 Logs, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 15, 2009, 4:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/-
science/news/2009/02/aaas-60tb-of-behavioral-data-the-everquest-2-server-logs.ars; see also 
Humphreys, supra note 
 In response 
34, at 156–57 (discussing the use of spyware to monitor the activities 
of participants in massively multiplayer online games). 
 212. See Jennifer Bresnahan, Personalization, Privacy, and the First Amendment: A Look at the 
Law and Policy Behind Electronic Databases, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, at *3 (2000); see also Tal Z. 
Zarsky, Mine Your Own Business: Making the Case for the Implications of the Data Mining of Personal 
Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 16 (2002). 
 213. See McCarthy, supra note 96. 
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to user feedback, the system was later changed to an opt-in system.214
Tensions over the use of personal information are likely to continue 
playing out in and around virtual communities for the foreseeable future. 
Many territorial states have some form of privacy legislation or general law 
rules on the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information, which 
may be used to restrain or limit the ability of a provider to unilaterally deal 
with participant data.
 Social 
networks are potentially rich sources of revenue for advertisers, but they also 
raise difficult questions about the juxtaposition of commercial and personal 
social relationships. 
215 More difficult considerations arise when participants 
are asked to trade consent to control their data for some internal or external 
benefits. In some cases, these trade-offs are benign and desirable; others, of 
course, may be exploitative.216 Regulating the disclosure of personal 
information from virtual communities into other contexts is accordingly a 
difficult process, but a familiar one.217
Using a rule of law framework, however, highlights that regulating 
collection and disclosure of information may not be sufficient to address the 
privacy interests of participants. Difficult issues arise when considering the 
use of private information within a virtual community, not merely its leakage 
out of the community. Because consenting to some level of collection is 
usually required in order to participate in a community, limits on disclosure 
typically mean that monitoring and use of information collected within the 
community by the provider itself is largely unregulated. Under such a regime, 
providers have an unfettered ability to monitor the communications and the 
actions of their participants, a proposition that conflicts with the limitations 
on governance expected of territorial states.  
 
As participants become more involved in virtual communities over an 
increasing range of activities, limits on the storage and use of information 
collected within the community itself are likely to grow in importance. The 
potential for harmful use of personal information that passes through a social 
                                                                                       
 214. Mark Zuckerberg, Thoughts on Beacon, FACEBOOK (Dec. 5, 2007), http://blog.face-
book.com/blog.php?post=7584397130. 
 215. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, 
INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW (3d ed. 2009) (providing an overview of information privacy 
laws). 
 216. Radin argues that even where the trade-off is fully informed, individual waiver may 
deleteriously alter the character of society for those who do not waive their rights and 
accordingly prohibit all such waivers. Radin, supra note 38, at 151. 
 217. See Tal Z. Zarsky, Information Privacy in Virtual Worlds: Identifying Unique Concerns 
Beyond the Online and Offline Worlds, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 231, 243 (2004) (discussing privacy 
interests in virtual worlds). 
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network is not limited to linking internal profiles to external shopping or 
browsing information. A Facebook member may have a legitimate expectation 
that her private messages and photos will not be viewed and distributed by 
people within the organization, for example, even if they are not distributed 
to third parties. Participants in other communities, particularly virtual worlds, 
may have an interest in preventing the provider from building and utilizing a 
comprehensive behavioral profile in order to increase retention rates or to 
deliver highly targeted and influential marketing campaigns.218 Further 
tensions exist around the powerlessness of participants in controlling the 
information that is collected about themselves and the internalization of 
external norms under the perpetual potentiality of surveillance.219
If these types of problems are to be addressed, privacy may need to be 
reconceptualized,
 
220 because a model that focuses on leakage of information 
outside of the initial area of collection is unlikely to properly consider issues 
of use, within the community, of information that is necessarily divulged 
through participation. These types of concerns will likely become more 
important in the future as the personal information that is collected within 
virtual communities continues to grow.221
4. Rights of  Legal Enforcement 
 There are, however, difficult issues 
to resolve in any conception of privacy that attempts to address these 
tensions. Most importantly, any such concerns must be carefully balanced 
against the benefit that participants obtain through enjoying a community 
that is tailored to their tastes and needs. 
The rule of law discourse suggests another substantive limit on autonomy 
that is derived from the ideal of access to justice: a requirement that citizens 
ought to be able to enforce their rights in the legal system.222
                                                                                       
 218. Id. at 255–56, 259–64. 
 This is 
essentially a corollary to the principle that governance should be limited by 
law; an idea that would have little significance if the citizen is practically 
prevented from challenging the actions of the government. Applying this 
principle to online contracts highlights potential problems with contractual 
 219. Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 
194 (2008); Penney, supra note 110, at 233 (discussing privacy issues that arise around actions 
and information within virtual environments); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer 
Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1415 (2000). 
 220. See Cohen, supra note 219, at 194–96; Penney, supra note 110 (arguing that a 
simplified model of privacy is required in order to address new concerns about privacy in 
virtual spaces).  
 221. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 15, at 72 n.386. 
 222. Raz, supra note 86, at 200–02. 
1817-1886_SUZOR WEB (DO NOT DELETE) 7/5/2011 10:27 PM 
1864 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25:1817 
terms that purport to exclude legal enforcement.223 This category includes 
terms providing “that the recipient would have no right of legal action or 
remedy under any circumstances,” and other “gray area” terms, such as 
requirements to submit to binding arbitration, exclusion of class actions, 
undertakings to pay attorney’s fees, and “severe curtailment of remedies,” 
such as “clauses limiting the remedy for a victorious plaintiff to whatever the 
recipient paid for a service.”224
Clauses in this broad category are relatively common in virtual 
community contracts. The Second Life Terms of Service, for example, 
previously required that any plaintiffs submit to binding arbitration in Linden 
Lab’s home state.
 
225 Such a clause can be very effective at limiting legal 
redress for participants who allege that they have been wronged because 
arbitration is often expensive, travel to the provider’s jurisdiction may be 
prohibitive, and arbitrators tend to determine cases in favor of the large 
corporate actors.226 The district court in Bragg refused to uphold the binding 
arbitration clause in Linden’s favor, holding that it was procedurally and 
substantively unconscionable.227 In coming to this conclusion, Judge 
Robreno held that “[i]n effect, the TOS provide Linden with a variety of 
one-sided remedies to resolve disputes, while forcing its customers to 
arbitrate any disputes with Linden.”228
The decision in Bragg follows that of the U.S. district court in Comb v. 
Paypal, which held that a compulsory arbitration clause in the Paypal Terms 
of Service was unconscionable because of “a lack of mutuality in the User 
Agreement and the practical effects of the arbitration clause with respect to 
consolidation of claims, the costs of arbitration, and venue.”
 
229
                                                                                       
 223. Radin, supra note 
 These cases 
38, at 150. 
 224. Id. at 150–51. 
 225. See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 606–07 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
The updated Terms of Service provide for optional binding non-appearance-based 
arbitration. See Linden Lab, SECOND LIFE TERMS OF SERVICE, § 12 (Oct. 6, 2010), 
http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php. 
 226. See, e.g., Robert Berner & Brian Grow, Banks vs. Consumers (Guess Who Wins), 
BUSINESS WEEK, June 5, 2008, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/-
content/08_24/b4088072611398.htm (explaining that individuals who agree to credit card 
terms of agreement unknowingly submit to the arbitration clauses that make it difficult to 
prevail against the large corporations); Alex Chasick, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Still Sucks, 
CONSUMERIST (June 9, 2008, 6:18 PM), http://consumerist.com/5014412/mandatory-
binding-arbitration-still-sucks (highlighting claims that the vast majority of arbitrations 
between corporations and consumers are resolved in the corporation’s favor). 
 227. Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 611. 
 228. Id. at 608. 
 229. Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
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suggest that courts may be increasingly willing to refuse to uphold terms that 
limit participants’ rights of legal enforcement.230
5. Summary of  Substantive Values and a More General Application 
  
The stronger forms of the arguments for cyberspace self-governance 
suggest that the role of the state in imposing substantive limits on autonomy 
should be minimal to non-existent. These arguments are generally premised 
on the fact that individuals who disagree with the norms within a given 
virtual community have the ability to leave the community, a power which is 
much more difficult to exercise in the corporeal world. With this logic, since 
values are subjective, it makes little sense for the territorial state to limit the 
scope of autonomy and consensual participation in virtual communities. 
This logic is faulty for a number of reasons. Primarily, as argued above, 
the deterministic assumptions that norms of virtual communities will 
necessarily be better than those of territorial states are fundamentally flawed. 
Irrespective of those assumptions, however, the territorial state continues to 
have some responsibility to protect its citizens and limit their autonomy, 
whether they are interacting with other citizens or with foreigners, online or 
off. Accordingly, the substantive values that a territorial state believes are 
important are likely to influence the boundaries of acceptable self-
governance, at least for citizens of that territorial state and to the extent that 
any such limits can be effective. 
It is not possible to provide any definitive answers as to which values 
should be read into virtual community governance structures. The answer 
will always depend upon the community context, the level of harm that 
participants are exposed to, and the beneficial effects, if any, of allowing the 
community to determine its own substantive values. The exact content and 
bounds of any such limits will always be highly contextual. 
The rule of law analysis helps to highlight some of the more pressing 
tensions that surround private governance in virtual communities. The sets 
of values canvassed here: discrimination, speech, property, privacy, and rights 
of legal enforcement, are merely indicative of a much larger set of the issues 
that societies are continuously debating as new technologies bring changing 
social practices. It would be a mistake to treat any of these values as having a 
universal application, but this set provides a first pass that may give courts 
reason to pause and more closely consider the legitimacy of a contractual 
                                                                                       
 230. See Ryan Kriegshauser, The Shot Heard Around the Virtual Worlds: The Emergence and 
Future of Unconscionability in Agreements Relating to Property in Virtual Worlds, 76 UMKC L. REV. 
1077, 1094–1107 (2008). 
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framework that purports to disclaim them. The effectiveness of substantive 
limits on autonomy is of course widely varied, but it no longer seems 
plausible to claim that cyberspace is immune from the exercise of power by 
territorial states. This rule of law analysis supports the conclusion that 
territorial states have a legitimate interest in restraining the autonomy of their 
citizens, whether that autonomy is mediated through cyberspace or not. 
IV. FORMAL LEGALITY 
Because of the difficulty in articulating universally applicable substantive 
rights, many modern liberal rule of law theorists developed models centering 
on formal legality in legitimate governance instead.231 This conception of the 
rule of law requires “that laws be declared publicly in clear terms in advance, 
be applied equally, and be interpreted and applied with certainty and 
reliability”232 in order that the law “be capable of guiding the behavior of its 
subjects.”233 It follows that “[a]ll laws should be prospective, open, and clear” 
and that “[l]aws should be relatively stable.”234 These principles, stated in a 
number of different ways, form the standard liberal understanding of the rule 
of law.235
A. PREDICTABILITY 
 The emphasis on the law’s ability to guide the behavior of its 
subjects leads to two somewhat separable themes in this conception of the 
rule of law: an aspiration towards clarity and predictability in legal rules and, 
to a lesser extent, a set of due process requirements in the application of 
those rules. 
An important component of formal legality is the ideal that laws ought to 
be sufficiently predictable to allow citizens to structure their lives with some 
degree of certainty. The rule of law “makes it possible to foresee with fair 
certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given 
circumstances to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this 
knowledge.”236
                                                                                       
 231. TAMANAHA, supra note 
 To enhance predictability and the liberty of legal subjects, 
scholars who advocate formal legality emphasize the importance of a system 
98, at 119.  
 232. Id. at 34 (discussing “legal liberty”).  
 233. Raz, supra note 86, at 198 (emphasis removed). 
 234. Id. at 198–99 (emphasis removed). 
 235. See generally FULLER, supra note 86, at 38–39 (explaining failure in a legal system 
predominantly by reference to the clarity and regularity of law); HAYEK, supra note 86, at 80 
(arguing that the rule of law, “[s]tripped of all technicalities,” is concerned with enabling 
individuals to plan their affairs). 
 236. HAYEK, supra note 86, at 80. 
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that provides clear, prospective rules that are well-promulgated, reasonably 
constant, and consistently enforced.237
When comparing the practice of governance within virtual communities 
against the requirements of formal legality in the rule of law, it becomes clear 
that private governance does not currently live up to the ideals of 
encouraging predictability and guiding behavior.
  
238 This may, of course, be 
perfectly desirable; one can imagine that some games, for example, may be 
much more interesting if the rules are not completely predictable.239
1. Clear Rules 
 
Alternatively, a lack of predictability in the interests of community solidarity 
in relatively homogeneous communities could be acceptable. For example, a 
small, tight-knit community with shared understandings of appropriate 
behavior may not need formally articulated rules or restraints on the power 
of the administrator to eject members deemed to be disruptive or unwanted. 
In some communities, however, particularly those that foster a more diverse 
population and are relatively open-ended, a perceived lack of predictability 
may be harmful to the interests of participants and imposing limits on private 
governance may be justified. 
The requirement that rules be clearly expressed and promulgated is 
familiar in the liberal rule of law discourse, where the emphasis is on the 
ability of law to guide behavior and the ability of citizens to plan their lives.240 
This discourse immediately highlights that the rules in virtual communities 
are often unclear, obscure, and difficult to understand. The contractual terms 
of service and end user license agreement (“EULA”) documents are usually 
written in dense legalese and are usually presented in a form that discourages 
reading.241
                                                                                       
 237. Raz, supra note 
  
86, at 198–200. 
 238. See Risch, supra note 105, at 19. 
 239. See Aki Järvinen, Introducing Applied Ludology: Hands-on Methods for Game 
Studies, Presentation at Situated Play, Proceedings of the DiGRA 2007 Conference: 
International Conference of the Digital Games Research Association, 134, 141–42 (Sept. 27, 
2007) (transcript available at http://www.digra.org/dl/db/07313.07490.pdf) (arguing that 
“the emotion of suspense is a fundamental emotion of player experiences, because it is a 
compound emotion where the emotions of hope, fear, and uncertainty come together”).  
 240. FULLER, supra note 86, at 38–40; HAYEK, supra note 86, at 80; RAWLS, supra note 87, 
at 238; Raz, supra note 86, at 200–02; see also TAMANAHA, supra note 98, at 93–94. 
 241. Clapperton & Corones, supra note 37, at 9; Fred Von Lohmann, Machinima: 
Copyright and Contract in a New Medium, Presentation at the Computer Games, Law, 
Regulation, and Policy Symposium (Feb. 14, 2008). 
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To the extent that Montesquieu is correct in saying that “[l]iberty is the 
right to do everything the law permits,”242 virtual communities do not rate 
highly on an imaginary scale of liberty. Some communities may create 
additional terms of conduct to govern internal behavior. These terms of 
conduct are often more clearly enumerated than the purely contractual terms 
of service, but even these are often unclear and indeterminate.243
This leaves the question, however, of what to make of the obscure terms 
that form part of the formal contract but are not clearly understood by the 
community. There is at least an argument that the more onerous or 
surprising of these should not be upheld,
 Where these 
codes are sufficiently clear and effective, they may be more useful in 
structuring a participant’s behavior within the community than the 
contractual terms, and may therefore more adequately satisfy the ideals of the 
rule of law and Montesquieu’s conception of liberty. 
244
2. Changing Rules 
 which would force providers to 
make an effort to ensure that participants are aware of and understand the 
key rules. This type of contractual approach may not address any problems 
with the substantive content of EULAs and terms of service, but it is likely 
to at least enhance the rule of law ideal that rules be sufficiently clear and 
promulgated.  
Another problematic component of virtual community governance is the 
rate at which legal rules can change and the lack of responsibility that 
providers have to compensate any participants who may be adversely 
affected by rule changes. Many providers purport to have the right to modify 
the terms of service at any time, often without notice to the participants.245
                                                                                       
 242. CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 155 (Anne M. 
Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller & Harold Samuel Stone eds. & trans., 1989); see also 
TAMANAHA, supra note 
 
Changes in these legal rules are rarely highlighted to the participant, who may 
98, at 52 (explaining the importance of the rule of law as a protection 
from tyranny for liberal legality). 
 243. See Risch, supra note 105, at 31. 
 244. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 
370 (1960).  
 245. Andrew Jankowich, in a study of the license agreements of virtual communities, 
found that “[o]f the agreements surveyed in this study, 75.00% reserved to proprietors the 
right to modify the agreements at their discretion and 39.58% allowed proprietors to modify 
documents without notice to the participants who are the other less powerful party.” 
Jankowich, supra note 40, at 47. 
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have substantial difficulty in identifying the changes and their legal effect.246 
This suggests that the mechanism of changing rules should be investigated, 
requiring, for example, that providers make clear statements about the effects 
of any changes and highlight modified sections in the dense legal agreements 
in order to enable participants to identify and understand rule changes.247
Apart from the difficulty in identifying changes, rule changes can have 
significant effects on the entitlements of participants within the virtual 
community. An interesting example comes from the ban on gambling within 
Second Life in July 2007.
 
248 For some time, a number of participants in Second 
Life were able to profit from establishing in-world casinos, where players 
could gamble Linden Dollars in unregulated gaming machines. Linden 
Dollars, as mentioned below, are fluidly convertible with U.S. dollars, but are 
stated by Linden Lab to be a “limited license” right, not a currency.249 After 
some interest by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation on the practice of 
gambling in Second Life,250 Linden introduced a rule change that prohibited 
any gambling outright.251
The immediate effect of the ban was that participants who had invested 
in the creation of casinos were forced to close down, losing future revenues 
upon which they may have been relying.
  
252
                                                                                       
 246. See id. (arguing that the lack of clarity in rule changes “seems designed to encourage 
participants to be responsible for their role under EULAw while discouraging them from 
being aware of the extent of those responsibilities”).  
 Many participants complained 
 247. Fairfield argues that: 
[T]his kind of coercive information forcing rarely helps in the context of 
mass-market contracts. Consumers never read the new and improved 
contracts that courts labour over. Requiring consumers to read lengthy 
contracts . . . is not a solution, it is part of the problem. The resulting 
transaction costs would kill many of the mass-market deals that, in the 
aggregate, provide an enormous benefit to society. Thus, the old judicial 
standby of adopting information-forcing rules that require consumers to 
read contracts is inadequate. 
Fairfield, supra note 55, at 468–69. 
 248. Robin Linden, Wagering in Second Life: New Policy, SECOND LIFE BLOGS (July 25, 
2007), https://blogs.secondlife.com/community/features/blog/2007/07/26/wagering-in-
second-life-new-policy. 
 249. Terms of Service, SECOND LIFE, § 5.1 (Oct. 6, 2010), http://secondlife.com/-
corporate/tos.php.  
 250. Virtual Feds Visit Second Life Casinos, CNN.COM (Apr. 4, 2007, 9:50 AM), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070408124303/http://www.cnn.com/2007/TECH/interne
t/04/04/secondlife.gambling.reut/index.html (Internet Archive copy). 
 251. Linden, supra note 248. 
 252. See Thomas Claburn, Second Life Gambling Ban Gets Mixed Reaction, 
INFORMATIONWEEK (July 26, 2007, 5:00 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/news/-
internet/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=201201441. 
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about the rule change, arguing that while unregulated online gambling was 
not permissible in the United States, there were casino operators and players 
who were not situated in the United States.253 Linden responded to this claim 
by stating that “[t]his policy applies to all use of Second Life. It isn’t intended 
to describe what is or isn’t legal for any particular resident or in any particular 
place. It describes what Linden Lab believes is appropriate to maintain its 
business requirements and to operate Second Life.”254
The longer term effects of the ban were more widely felt. Unregulated 
banks had become popular in Second Life as a result of the growing virtual 
economy, some of which were offering returns of between thirty and sixty 
percent.
 
255 When Linden banned gambling, the casino operators, who were 
making thousands of USD equivalent Linden Dollars in profit every month, 
quickly sought to redeem their stored Linden Dollars, and a run on the 
virtual banks ensued.256 The biggest bank, Ginko Financial, collapsed, taking 
with it several thousands of U.S. investment dollars.257 This eventually 
prompted Linden Lab to introduce another rule change, banning virtual 
banks by prohibiting the payment of interest in-world by anyone not 
registered as a regulated bank by a territorial government.258
This example shows that rule changes can have significant effects. 
Certainly, gambling within Second Life was likely to be illegal under U.S. law 
and that of several other jurisdictions.
 
259
                                                                                       
 253. See Christine Hurt, From Virtual Tax to Virtual Gambling, CONGLOMERATE (Apr. 9, 
2007), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2007/04/from_virtual_ta.html. 
 Further, the unregulated banking 
industry within Second Life appeared to be completely unsustainable and 
 254. Linden, supra note 248. 
 255. David Bester, A Virtual Crash: The Rise and Fall of Ginko Financial, THINK 
MAGAZINE (Jan. 2009), available at http://www.algorithmics.com/think/January09/Algo-
THINK0109-VC-Bester.pdf. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See Pixeleen Mistral, Ginko Financial’s End-Game, ALPHAVILLE HERALD (Aug. 6, 
2007), http://alphavilleherald.com/2007/00/ginko-financial-2.html. Media reports indicated 
that the total amount lost to Ginko Financial was in the vicinity of $750,000, but this may be 
highly inflated: “[T]his figure doesn’t reflect actual losses. It likely includes fictitious interest 
to be paid out over time, and employee salaries. The average individual loss to depositors 
was probably in the hundreds or in some cases the low thousands.” Bester, supra note 255 
(quoting Benjamin Duranske). 
 258. Kend Linden, New Policy Regarding In-World “Banks,” SECOND LIFE BLOGS (Jan. 8, 
2008, 6:43 PM), https://blogs.secondlife.com/community/features/blog/2008/01/08/new-
policy-regarding-in-world-banks. 
 259. See Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361–5367 (2006); 
see also Susan W. Brenner, Fantasy Crime: The Role of Criminal Law in Virtual Worlds, 11 VAND. 
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 54 (2008). 
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resembled Ponzi schemes more than legitimate banking institutes.260
In this case, it is likely that the ban on gambling was not an illegitimate 
evolution of Second Life norms: 
 Both of 
these rule changes were likely justified as protecting Linden Lab and Second 
Life participants. The changes, however, did create real financial losses for 
people who were encouraged to invest in Second Life because of the high 
potential returns and the lack of prohibitions on gambling or financial 
markets. 
The ban was not a frequent change; it was not as if Second Life 
banned entire lines of business and then reinstated them on a 
regular basis. The contract amendment was not arbitrary; gambling 
is illegal in many jurisdictions. The rule had no ex post facto effect; 
no one was penalized for past gambling. Additionally, the change 
was not targeted; it was a general rule with general application. So 
long as Second Life made no affirmative promises that gambling 
would be legal, the contractual law against gambling was no 
different from any legislative ban on real-world gambling, in 
accordance with the rule of law.261
 This analysis highlights, however, that where a change is not legitimate, 
imposing a requirement on the providers of virtual communities that just 
compensation be paid when entitlements are destroyed is not inconceivable, 
particularly where virtual currency is fluidly convertible into real currencies. 
The competing tensions are the provider’s ability to make and change 
internal rules that evolve over time and to suit new circumstances or to 
comply with external requirements,
 
262
3. Emergent Behavior and Uncertain Rules 
 against the participants’ interests in 
having some measure of security in their virtual assets. 
As part of the emphasis on predictability, liberal rule of law theorists 
strongly disfavor ex post facto laws.263
                                                                                       
 260. Benjamin Duranske, a prominent commentator on Second Life legal news, claimed 
that he was “now completely certain that Ginko is paying its obligations to previous 
depositors with new depositors’ money rather than investing that money. As such, over two 
years of speculation about whether Ginko is a Ponzi scheme is over—it undeniably is.” 
Benjamin Duranske, Law Journal Says Ginko Financial Probable Ponzi; Yield Down 60% in 16 
Months, VIRTUALLY BLIND (Feb. 23, 2007), http://virtuallyblind.com/2007/02/23/business-
law-journal-ginko/; see also Mark Cassidy, Virtual Bank, Real Scam?, ILL. BUS. L.J. (Feb. 12, 
2007, 5:51 PM), http://www.law.uiuc.edu/bljournal/post/2007/02/12/virtual-Bank-real-
scam.aspx. 
 A law that is not clearly expressed at a 
 261. Risch, supra note 105, at 29. 
 262. See Balkin, supra note 28, at 2051; Bartle, supra note 50, at 33. 
 263. FULLER, supra note 86, at 51–62; RAWLS, supra note 87, at 238. 
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time before a citizen takes an action is unable to guide that person’s behavior 
as “[o]ne cannot be guided by a retroactive law.”264 This raises some 
immediate concerns in virtual communities, where apart from being subject 
to change, the rules are often enforced on an ad-hoc or retroactive basis, 
particularly when a new exploit is discovered, for example.265 When 
unanticipated emergent behavior results in undesirable consequences, 
providers may attempt to punish the participants who make use of a newly 
discovered bug or exploit in the platform. This is done in a way that lessens 
certainty. Participants may have difficulty differentiating between behavior 
that is rewarded with material advantage or fame within the community and 
behavior that will be deemed against the rules and punished after the fact.266
Some examples may be useful here. In the Bragg case, Bragg allegedly 
took advantage of a bug in Linden’s auction management software to 
purchase land that had not been advertised for sale, with the lack of 
competition allowing him to purchase the land significantly under market 
value.
 
267 Linden responded by terminating his account, alleging that he had 
taken advantage of an exploit.268 Alternatively, take the case of a guild in 
World of Warcraft that was accidentally given a developer item which gave 
them unparalleled power in the virtual world.269 When they used the item to 
beat the hardest challenges in the game, they were swiftly punished for 
exploitation, by permanent cancellation of their accounts.270
It may be that the participants in these examples should have known that 
their behavior would likely be punished. On the other hand, however, it is 
not always simple to identify wrongdoing. Significant gains are often 
achieved by members of virtual communities who are able to push the 
 
                                                                                       
 264. Raz, supra note 86, at 198. 
 265. See MIA CONSALVO, CHEATING: GAINING ADVANTAGE IN VIDEOGAMES 114–16, 
142–44 (2007). 
 266. TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 51 (“[M]any actions deemed ‘griefing’ or ‘exploiting’ exist 
on the boundary lines of the game—often in spaces in which the rule set is not clearly 
defined or the system itself is ambiguous.”); Humphreys, supra note 32, at 91 (reporting that 
“[t]rouble seemed to arise around the finer points of when play is actually cheating and when 
it is just clever, expert play from someone who knows the game inside out”). 
 267. Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 597 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 268. Id. 
 269. See Andres Guadamuz, Avatars Behaving Badly, TECHNOLLAMA (June 3, 2009), 
http://www.technollama.co.uk/avatars-behaving-badly. 
 270. For a similar account of developers punishing participants who were mistakenly 
given powers, see Sal Humphreys, Massively Multiplayer Online Games Productive Players 
and Their Disruptions to Conventional Media Practices 152–54 (2005) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Queensland University of Technology), available at http://eprints.qut.edu.au/-
16119/. 
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boundaries and find innovative new ways of doing things.271
The prevalence of unanticipated consequences to technical changes and 
the propensity of participants to exploit them suggests that providers may 
need a certain degree of flexibility in the application and enforcement of rules 
in order to maintain a cohesive community. The ability to punish 
retroactively may be necessary in the interests of maintaining order, 
particularly where the exploitative behavior clearly contravenes community 
expectations, if not explicit rules. Enforcing retrospective rules would not 
necessarily contravene the ideals of the rule of law in such situations: 
 There is clearly 
room for disagreement as to whether certain forms of emergent behavior are 
or ought to be prohibited. A participant who is punished for behavior that 
she believed to be within the scope of the rules may legitimately feel 
aggrieved by a provider’s determination that it was not. 
In the pragmatic view, a rule will be public whenever strong social 
agreement exists in practice, regardless of whether a legislature or a 
court has spoken. Similarly, if a rule exists normatively even 
without specific legislative enactment (as, for example, would a rule 
against intentional homicide), then later legislative confirmation 
would not necessarily mean that it would be unfair retroactive 
application to punish earlier transgressions. Moreover, where the 
line of evolution of legal interpretation is clearly foreseeable, it 
would not be unfair to hold people to what they can see is the 
emerging interpretation.272
This reasoning suggests that some leeway is required in order to allow 
providers to react to emergent behavior. In other cases, however, where 
participants are acting in accordance with both the stated rules and 
community standards, retroactive changes to the rules that significantly 
impact their interests could give rise to an obligation of compensation. The 
gray areas, where behavior is neither clearly within or outside of community 
standards, are much more difficult to satisfactorily determine. In some 
communities, it will be best to defer to the findings of the provider in order 
to maintain social cohesion; in others, particularly where the community is 
less cohesive or more open-ended, it may be best to take the more liberal 
view and allow all behavior that is not explicitly prohibited. As always, the 
context is important; the needs of particular communities will be different in 
every case. There is, however, a real tension between the need for flexibility 
and the serious threat posed by inconsistent application of the rules. 
 
                                                                                       
 271. See CONSALVO, supra note 265, at 122–23 (explaining various motivations for 
cheating in games). 
 272. Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 815 (1989). 
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4. Inconsistent Application and Discretionary Enforcement 
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of virtual community governance is 
that the rules on the books, the EULAs and terms of service, sometimes bear 
almost no resemblance to the rules in force in the community. Virtual 
community contracts are typically drafted in a very risk-averse manner, 
reserving for the provider almost total power to deal with members of the 
community. This often includes broad prohibitions on behavior that is 
commonplace within the community.273 In many cases, the provider is not 
interested in enforcing these contracts as written but will use them as a tool 
against particular participants as it sees fit.274 Essentially, these contracts are 
designed to reserve a wide range of discretionary powers for the provider, 
which is a concept that directly contradicts the values of formal legality in the 
rule of law that are generally understood to require that “similar cases be 
treated similarly.”275
Resolving the tension between the need for flexibility and the need to 
avoid the worst effects of inconsistent application of discretionary rules is a 
difficult task that speaks to the core of the tension between formal and 
substantive conceptions of justice.
 
276
 
 In moving away from purely positive 
accounts of law and responding to the need to allow, but simultaneously 
constrain the discretionary exercise of governance powers, the next set of 
values of the rule of law embrace requirements of fairness, equality, and 
transparency as measures of legitimacy in decision making. 
                                                                                       
 273. See, e.g., Fairfield, supra note 55, at 462. 
 274. Risch, supra note 105, at 45 (“What providers generally want is a strict set of rules 
that they can enforce at will against a few users—a position directly contrary to the rule of 
law.”). 
 275. RAWLS, supra note 87, at 237. 
 276. Hayek, for example, strongly argued against the exercise of discretion in pursuit of 
substantive equality as threatening the impartiality and generality requirements of the rule of 
law. See FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT 
OF THE LIBERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 62–64 (1982). 
However, Allan contends:  
Hayek’s account of the rule of law may justly be criticized for adopting an 
interpretation of equality—in the sense of generality or impartiality—that 
leaves no scope for legitimate political debate and action. By excluding 
redistributive economic aims and outlawing governmental powers of 
economic management, Hayek’s theory of constitutional freedom strips 
politics of the role it must play if the citizen is to be in any real sense an 
architect (together with others) of the scheme of justice he is expected to 
serve and endorse. 
ALLAN, supra note 85, at 15. 
1817-1886_SUZOR WEB (DO NOT DELETE) 7/5/2011 10:27 PM 
2010] RULE OF LAW IN VIRTUAL COMMUNITIES 1875 
B. PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 
This next set of formal rule of law values includes requirements of 
procedural fairness and “the availability of a fair hearing within the judicial 
process.”277 The rule of law requires an independent judiciary, the 
observation of principles of natural justice, judicial review over legislative and 
administrative power, easy access to courts, and limits on the discretion of 
the police.278 The rule of law encompasses “the regular, impartial, and in this 
sense fair administration of law,”279 and requires some form of due process: 
that is, a process reasonably designed to ascertain the truth, in ways 
consistent with the other ends of the legal system, as to whether a violation 
has taken place and under what circumstances.”280 Only through conducting 
orderly trials and hearings with defined rules of evidence could the legal 
system “preserve the integrity of the judicial process.”281
This second part of the ideal of formal legality focuses on the procedure 
through which legal norms are enforced. A key component of this aspect of 
the rule of law requires that laws are enforced fairly and that there are 
guarantees of fair hearings and due process available to those adversely 
affected.
 
282
Bragg once again provides a good case study of potential procedural limits 
on a provider’s exercise of power. Essentially, Bragg was alleged to have 
broken the rules by exploiting a loophole and purchasing virtual land 
significantly under market value, and Linden Lab took action by cancelling 
his account and confiscating not only the contested land, but all his other 
virtual Second Life assets.
 Here again, private governance in virtual communities is 
potentially problematic. Providers are generally used to wielding absolute 
power, and the determination of when participants have broken the rules and 
what punishments are to be inflicted are very rarely subject to accountable 
procedural safeguards.  
283
                                                                                       
 277. TAMANAHA, supra note 
 Bragg disputed both the allegation that he had 
broken the rules and the penalty that was applied. Linden’s position, as the 
creator, enforcer, and adjudicator of the rules, makes it difficult for Bragg to 
trust that Linden’s decision was arrived at fairly and makes it altogether 
98, at 119. 
 278. Raz, supra note 86, at 200–02. 
 279. RAWLS, supra note 87, at 235. 
 280. Id. at 239. 
 281. Id. at 238. 
 282. ALLAN, supra note 85, at 121 (“Conformity to [precepts of due process and equal 
justice] ensures a genuine—substantive—equality of all before a law that serves a coherent 
(if capacious and adaptable) conception of the common good.”). 
 283. Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 597 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
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impossible for Bragg to appeal within the system of review for either the 
finding of guilt or the penalty imposed. 
Another example comes from World of Warcraft in 2006, when Blizzard 
banned a large number of players who were running the game under a 
GNU/Linux operating system.284
The players found the process involved in getting their accounts 
reinstated very opaque. They were sent form letter responses to 
their appeals to customer service. No indication was given that an 
investigation was underway and there was no way to know whether 
any of their complaints were being addressed. The lack of 
transparency and the realization that there would not necessarily be 
any “justice” was a source of great concern.
 Blizzard’s anti-cheating software 
mistakenly identified these players as cheaters, and they were accordingly 
banned for using unauthorized third party software. The lack of due process 
had harmful effects on these players: 
285
The accounts of the affected players were eventually reinstated, along 
with an apology and a compensatory credit.
 
286 This as an example of a 
desirable resolution and a satisfactory review policy. The tensions that this 
example highlights, however, are the damaging effects on players of a lack of 
due process—not just the result of being banned, but the uncertainty, the 
frustration of not being able to appeal the decision, and the damage to the 
participant’s reputation and integrity that accompanies a false accusation.287
These examples raise an interesting set of questions. In order to provide 
a useful platform and create a harmonious community, the provider generally 
requires some discretion in the ability to create and enforce internal rules. In 
order for the exercise of discretion to be considered legitimate, however, the 
lack of procedural fairness, perceived equality, and transparency that often 
negatively characterizes the private exercise of power must be addressed. 
 
Conceivably, virtual communities could create governance and oversight 
mechanisms that ensure that decisions to enforce the rules and punish 
participants are justly enforced. There will likely still be problems, however, 
where either these procedures do not exist or where they do not instill 
                                                                                       
 284. See Anonymous, Over 50% Cedega WoW Accounts Banned, LINUX-GAMERS.NET (Nov. 
18, 2006, 10:45 AM), http://web.archive.org/web/20061123130644/http://www.linux-
gamers.net/modules/news/article.php?storyid=1852 (Internet Archive copy). 
 285. Humphreys, supra note 34, at 157. 
 286. See Ty, Blizzard Unbans Linux World of Warcraft Players, LINUX LOOKUP (Nov. 22, 
2006, 10:00 AM), http://www.linuxlookup.com/2006/nov/22/blizzard_unbans_-
linux_world_of_warcraft_players. 
 287. Humphreys, supra note 34, at 157. 
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sufficient confidence to reassure participants that the result is just. The 
question raised by the Bragg example remains: To what extent should the 
provider’s discretion in enforcing the rules be externally reviewable? 
A blanket rule that all administrative decisions are judicially reviewable 
would likely introduce much more overhead than is warranted, resulting in a 
system where the development and operation of innovative virtual 
communities is unduly disincentivized.288
It may not be necessary or desirable to bring in the whole of public 
administrative review processes into virtual governance decisions. Perhaps 
some of the ideals of administrative review could be used in the adjudication 
of contract law in these circumstances. It may be possible to limit broad 
discretionary powers in virtual community contracts or to impose restrictions 
on the exercise of those powers. Conceivably, if courts are able to find that 
virtual community contracts have been improperly terminated due to a lack 
of procedural fairness, then virtual communities will be prompted to 
implement internal procedures that engender the trust of the community. 
Obviously there are communities that will have no such need for procedural 
fairness, such as games where arbitrary action forms part of the 
entertainment value.
 Each additional measure of public 
oversight adds some overhead to the process, some drag to community 
governance. It is important to achieve a sensible balance between the desire 
to protect participants and the desire to encourage the development and 
growth of virtual communities. 
289
If the load on courts proves too great, establishing specialized tribunals 
to review these types of contractual governance issues could be an option. It 
seems likely, however, that only exceptional cases will continue to make it to 
the legal system. Accordingly, where there is significant procedural integrity 
in the exercise of a discretionary power in a virtual community contract, 
courts should probably defer to the provider’s judgment.
 But for other communities, a court may be able to 
evaluate with some sensitivity whether the procedures for imposing 
punishments or terminating subscriptions are carried out within the 
reasonable expectations of participants. In communities where both 
legitimacy and flexibility is important, it is only through introducing 
requirements of fairness and equality that states can ensure that discretion is 
legitimately exercised. 
290
                                                                                       
 288. See Richard Bartle, The Point of No Return, TERRA NOVA (Apr. 4, 2008), 
http://terranova.blogs.com/terra_nova/2008/04/the-point-of-no.html. 
 In cases where a 
 289. See Greg Lastowka, Rules of Play, 4 GAMES AND CULTURE 379, 390 (2009). 
 290. For example, Grimmelmann argues: 
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significant lack of procedural fairness can be shown, however, courts may be 
justified in holding that the contractual power was not properly exercised, 
potentially relying on such limiting doctrines as unconscionability,291 
waiver,292 good faith,293 or estoppel.294
V. THE ROLE OF CONSENT AND DEMOCRACY 
 If the contractual terms are rendered 
unenforceable in such exceptional cases with sufficient certainty to encourage 
providers to adopt reasonable safeguards on internal governance, a 
significant positive effect on the bulk of internal decision making may be 
achieved by establishing meaningful external bounds to providers’ executive 
discretion. 
Some conceptions of the rule of law predicate legitimacy on the consent 
of the governed, expressed primarily through the democratic process. In this 
way, consent provides substantive limits in a pluralistic system where 
universal values can no longer be explicitly justified.295
                                                                                       
Although plaintiff Marc Bragg’s allegations that Linden expropriated his 
land were explosive, Linden answered them with credible evidence that 
Bragg had taken unfair advantage of a bug in the land transaction system. 
That fact alone makes Linden’s suspension of his account sensible. The 
case settled, but had it reached a decision on the merits, the law should 
have treated Linden’s response as presumptively legitimate. 
 Fundamentally, “the 
Grimmelmann, supra note 59; see also ALLAN, supra note 85, at 16 (arguing that courts, in 
practice, generally give substantial deference to the discretionary exercise of reviewable 
powers “in recognition of their specialist knowledge and expertise”). 
 291. See, e.g., Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 597 (E.D. Pa. 2007) 
(holding that Linden Lab’s binding arbitration clause was procedurally and substantially 
unconscionable). 
 292. See, e.g., Erez Reuveni, On Virtual Worlds: Copyright and Contract Law at the Dawn of the 
Virtual Age, 82 IND. L.J. 261, 299–300 (2007) (arguing that waiver at common law may be 
applicable to virtual world contracts where developers do not consistently or uniformly 
enforce contractual terms). 
 293. See U.C.C. § 1-304 (1977) (obligation of good faith); see also Meehan, supra note 209, 
¶¶ 57–60. 
 294. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981); see also Steven J. 
Horowitz, Bragg v. Linden’s Second Life: A Primer in Virtual World Justice, 34 OHIO N.U. L. 
REV. 223, 236 (2008) (arguing that Bragg could potentially rely on an argument in estoppel 
to prevent Linden Lab from reneging on its assertion that Second Life residents own their 
virtual land); Kurt Hunt, This Land is Not Your Land: Second Life, CopyBot, and the Looming 
Question of Virtual Property Rights, 9 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 141, 155–56 (2007) (arguing 
that inducing participants to treat in-world currency as real money may lead to an 
enforceable modification to the EULA by promissory estoppel in communities like Project 
Entropia and Second Life); David P. Sheldon, Claiming Ownership, but Getting Owned: Contractual 
Limitations on Asserting Property Interests in Virtual Goods, 54 UCLA L. REV. 751, 779–82 (2007) 
(discussing the possibility of a successful promissory estoppel claim in virtual worlds). 
 295. TAMANAHA, supra note 98, at 99–100. 
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modern legal order can draw its legitimacy only from the idea of self-
determination: citizens should always be able to understand themselves also 
as authors of the law to which they are subject as addressees.”296
Consent may be the single most important aspect of legitimacy in the 
governance of virtual communities. Cyberlaw theory suggests that the main 
benefit of the autonomy of virtual communities is the ability of participants 
to come together in spaces whose norms differ from those of other 
communities.
 
297
The forms through which consent can be expressed differ for any given 
community. Some communities, like Wikipedia for example, explicitly 
integrate democratic processes, complete with the massive bureaucratic 
overhead that such processes entail.
 At its libertarian extreme, this ideal holds that through 
consensual participation in a boundless array of potential communities, each 
community’s rules will more closely match the preferences of its participants 
than any default set of rules could. In less strong conceptions, there is still a 
clear recognition that the promising potential of cyberspaces is their 
malleability, through which individuals and communities can consensually 
determine their own norms and create their own meaning. 
298 Others, like the Internet Engineering 
Task Force, rely on “rough consensus” and active participation.299 Still other 
communities, like A Tale in the Desert, Facebook, and EVE Online have 
attempted to involve their participants in the generation of constitutional 
rules and ongoing community governance.300 For many other communities, 
maintaining ongoing consent is an intricate exercise in customer relations.301 
For still more, consent is expressed by ongoing participation in the 
community where the rules are dictated by the provider, a hard line “take it 
or leave it” approach.302
                                                                                       
 296. HABERMAS, supra note 
 
88, at 449, quoted in TAMANAHA, supra note 98, at 99. 
 297. See generally Johnson & Post, Law and Borders, supra note 3. 
 298. See Malte Ziewitz, Order Without Law, Presentation at the Games Convention 
Online Conference Leipzig (Aug. 1, 2009).  
 299. Froomkin, supra note 43, at 794, 799–801. 
 300. See generally Timothy Burke, Play of State: Sovereignty and Governance in MMOGs 
11–13 (Aug. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.swarthmore.edu/-
SocSci/tburke1/The%20MMOG%20State.pdf (discussing models of state within virtual 
worlds).  
 301. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 186 (describing the importance of maintaining 
engagement amongst diverse player groups). 
 302. For example, the Something Awful community forums’ moderators “pride 
[themselves] on running one of the most entertaining and troll-free forums on the internet” 
by “charging a $10 fee to filter out folks not serious about adhering to the rules, and banning 
those who manage to slip through and break them.” See Forum Rules, SOMETHING AWFUL 
(Jan. 1, 2006), http://www.somethingawful.com/d/forum-rules/forum-rules.php?page=1. 
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Whatever the form consent takes, its existence will almost always change 
the evaluation of legitimacy of community governance. Where consent does 
not exist, there is little theoretical reason to allow the default rules of society 
to be suspended or modified. Where informed consent does exist, then 
concerns about predictability or substantive fairness are likely to be greatly 
alleviated. There must be room for participants who consensually choose to 
participate in communities whose rules may seem strange or arbitrary.303 A 
good example is EVE Online, where internal norms include the concept that 
“fraud is fun.”304 EVE’s participants understand, if not at the point of 
creating an account then certainly before they become heavily invested in the 
game, that they may be defrauded by other participants at any time. This 
consensual understanding is the primary reason that the large-scale frauds 
perpetrated by EVE’s participants should not be understood as either theft 
or fraud; the loss of thousands of hours of invested time through the deceit 
of another is fully understood to be within the rules of participation.305
Some difficulties appear when consensual internal norms conflict with 
external social values, particularly those which are expressed as partially or 
completely inalienable.
 Fraud 
cannot exist because consent nullifies the action. 
306
                                                                                       
The rules of participation in the forum are vigorously but subjectively enforced and 
continued participation is generally understood to be at the discretion of the administrators. 
Id. 
 Where consensual rules conflict with external 
values, territorial states continue to have an interest in limiting autonomy. 
Territorial states will often limit the internal norms that are socially repugnant 
or that have deleterious effects on people outside of the community. 
Territorial states routinely limit the scope of consent in issues of 
discrimination, for example, or in content matters such as the sexualized 
depiction of underage persons. In this context, police and policymakers have 
begun to grapple with the apparently consensual practice of teenagers sharing 
 303. Bartle, supra note 50. 
 304. Fairfield, supra note 55, at 460–61 (arguing that “the scope of acceptable behavior is 
not ultimately determined by the EULA. Whether ‘fraud is fun’ in a community ultimately 
depends on the views of a particular community. That, in turn, depends on the norms 
worked out between community members”). 
 305. Id.  
 306. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111 (1972) (describing 
inalienability rules designed to prevent inefficient outcomes from significant negative 
externalities); Radin, supra note 158 (explaining partial restrictions on commodification and 
alienability of interests). 
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sexual photos of themselves with other teens.307 Concerns about sexual play 
and the exposure and exploitation of children in virtual worlds are also 
increasingly prominent as territorial states begin to consider what type of 
behavior is permissible and when regulation is necessary.308
The emphasis on consent in this conception of the rule of law also 
illustrates a key tension between the internal norms of a community and the 
contractual terms of service. The contractual documents that purport to 
govern virtual communities are somewhat problematic in that they are rarely 
designed to encourage readability and understanding.
 
309
The EVE example can be contrasted with other cases in which consent 
to a purported change to default social rules is clearly not manifested. The 
Bragg case once again provides a useful example; there is a clear social norm 
within Second Life that participants own their virtual property and currency, 
one cultivated and encouraged by Linden Lab in its advertising materials and 
public statements.
 Moreover, they often 
conflict with the social norms within the community, usually because of 
discretionary enforcement, but also because norms within the community are 
continuously evolving through participation, whereas the written terms are 
unilaterally set in advance by the provider. As the community cultivates a 
separate understanding of the norms than is set out in the contractual 
documents, real questions of consent arise when the provider attempts to 
enforce the conflicting contractual provisions. 
310 The fine print in the Terms of Service, however, 
purports to disclaim any enforceable interests participants may have in virtual 
goods or currency.311
                                                                                       
 307. See, e.g., Nancy Rommelmann, Anatomy of a Child Pornographer, REASON (July 2009), 
available at http://reason.com/archives/2009/06/04/anatomy-of-a-child-pornographe 
(discussing the ramifications of “sexting”—the exchange of explicit images or videos 
amongst teens).  
 If the contractual terms are literally enforced, they will 
override the consensual social practices within the community. The 
proposition that Linden Lab was able to modify the default rules of property 
ownership unilaterally, in direct opposition to the understanding of the 
 308. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, VIRTUAL WORLDS AND KIDS: MAPPING THE RISKS 
(2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/alt038.shtm; R. 
Bloomfield & B. Duranske, Protecting Children in Virtual Worlds Without Undermining Their 
Economic, Educational, and Social Benefits, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1175 (2009); J. A. T. 
Fairfield, Virtual Parentalism, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1215 (2009); J. M. Shaughnessy, 
Protecting Virtual Playgrounds: Introduction, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 995 (2009); R. F. Wilson, 
Sex Play in Virtual Worlds, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1127 (2009).  
 309. Dale Clapperton, Electronic Contracts: A Law unto Themselves?, 130 MEDIA INT’L 
AUSTL., INCORPORATING CULTURE & POL’Y 102, 103 (2009). 
 310. See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 595–96 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 311. SECOND LIFE, supra note 249. 
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community, violates the ideal of governance limited by law. Instead, it 
resembles governance by fiat, where the technical rules that govern 
interaction are determined solely by the provider, in almost-absolute 
discretion, and bear almost no resemblance to those understood and 
accepted by the community.  
David Post argues strongly that rules imposed by external states are less 
legitimate than the rules developed by virtual communities themselves. State-
imposed rules completely abandon “any notion that governments 
derive . . . their just power from the consent of the governed, or that the 
individuals to whom law is applied have the right to participate in 
formulating those laws.”312 The imposition of rules by the territorial state 
stifles the ability of virtual communities to develop “as true communities, 
with shared norms and customs and expectations characteristic of each and 
continually being created and re-created by the members within each.”313 If 
the sovereignty of virtual communities is not recognized, then “no matter 
what steps they take to set up a fair and reasonable system for resolving 
virtual world disputes in accordance with newly created virtual world law, 
their efforts will come to nothing because they can’t create ‘real law,’ ” and 
users will “be stuck with the chaotic nonsense” of law imposed by various 
territorial jurisdictions.314 Being able to fall back on enforceable state law 
risks making virtual law “play-law.” “If everyone believes that ‘real law’ from 
‘real sovereigns’ is the only law that matters (or can ever matter),”315 then 
“who will undertake the hard work required to set up a legal system if it’s just 
play-law?”316
There are two main readings of Post’s argument. The strongest is a 
proposition that the rules of a virtual community can be the only legitimate 
source of law for participants in that community. This proposition is not 
particularly helpful. To suggest that internal norms will not adequately 
develop in the shadow of the territorial state seems to be a suspect 
assumption. After all, virtual communities rely upon the enforcement of 
territorial contract and property law, and “property and contract presuppose 
limits and enforcement shaped by a sovereign authority.”
 
317 Cyberspace self-
governance and state rules “form a mesh of rules,”318
                                                                                       
 312. Post, supra note 
 where state rules 
122, at 910. 
 313. Id. at 912. 
 314. Id. at 913. 
 315. Id. (emphasis removed). 
 316. Id. 
 317. Radin & Wagner, supra note 10, at 1296. 
 318. JEANNE PIA MIFSUD BONNICI, SELF-REGULATION IN CYBERSPACE 199 (2008). 
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support, maintain, and oversee self-regulation practices.319 This suspect 
assumption is unnecessary as there seems to be no reason to accept either 
full self-rule or total state control.320
A less forceful reading of Post’s argument, however, agrees with this 
Article’s conception of the role of consent in legitimate governance. If the 
internal norms that a community develops are not respected, then the ability 
of the community to govern itself may be harmed.
 
321
A further example may be found in the enforcement of bans on real 
money trades (“RMT”). Many virtual worlds ban the sale of virtual property 
for corporeal profit. Many such worlds, however, simultaneously introduce 
game mechanics that encourage RMT.
 In cases where the 
internal rules conflict with external values, such harm may be a necessary 
limit to self-governance. In other cases, however, legal results that conflict 
with internal norms for no justifiable reason must be treated with suspicion. 
The example from Second Life seems to reflect this concern: while the 
community organizes itself around principles of ownership interests in land 
and currency, the spectre of immanent revocation by Linden is likely to 
seriously limit any consensual governance processes. 
322 In cases where a ban on RMT is not 
actually enforced within the community, it may make sense not to allow its 
enforcement in territorial courts.323 For example, Sony Online Entertainment 
prohibits RMT between participants and explicitly disclaims any liability for 
destruction of the value of in-world property but provides some servers with 
an officially sanctioned trading hub where it is able to tax trades.324
                                                                                       
 319. Jeanne Bonnici argues: 
 An 
argument that subscribers own no value in their virtual property, based upon 
The advantages of the customised regulation of self-regulation cannot be 
achieved however without the constant support of states and state 
legislation. . . . [T]here is a continuing relevance of national legal orders. 
States are especially indispensable in providing a general framework of 
legislation and legal mechanisms that ground self-regulation. It is also 
important that states continue acting as “watchdog” on the regulatory 
actions of the groups. Oversight by states is indispensable for the fair 
running of the customised rules. States should continue to assist in the 
development and maintenance of the self-regulation rules, including by 
continuing financial assistance. 
Id. at 213. 
 320. Cohen, supra note 4, at 224. 
 321. Post, supra note 122, at 913. 
 322. Juho Hamari & Vili Lehdonvirta, Game Design as Marketing: How Game Mechanics 
Create Demand for Virtual Goods, 5 INT’L J. BUS. SCI. & APPLIED MGMT. 14 (2010). 
 323. Balkin, supra note 28, at 78. 
 324. Station.com—Terms of Service, SONY ONLINE ENTM’T, § VII(F)(2), 
http://www.station.sony.com/en/termsofservice.vm#n7 (last visited Aug. 27, 2009).  
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a technical reading of the EULA, may be suspect if there turns out to be a 
general community expectation that both avatars and property are fluidly 
exchangeable for real world currency.325
One of the key features of rule of law limits on governance seems to be 
that they exist because people believe they exist.
 
326
Recourse to external standards to enforce disputes in virtual communities 
is potentially damaging to the development of internal dispute resolution 
mechanisms and internal governance.
 This circular recognition 
may actually prove quite useful in evaluating appropriate regulatory responses 
to governance issues. In the Second Life example, the primary justification for 
enforcing the property rights of Second Life residents is that the residents 
believe they have them. The provider, by supporting and encouraging the 
belief that its power is limited, can be expected or compelled to uphold those 
expectations. In another environment, where the participants do not believe 
that property rights exist, then the provider or other participants have no 
obligations to respect the possessive rights of participants to their virtual 
assets. Essentially, this approach prioritizes the role of real consent in 
substantive governance, which distinguishes internal norms that ought to be 
upheld from those that should not. 
327 At least to the extent that internal 
norms do not conflict with external values, then, it may also be desirable to 
avoid overriding consensual internal governance with a strict literal 
interpretation of the contractual documents.328
                                                                                       
 325. A whitepaper commissioned for Sony Online Entertainment reveals that in its first 
year of operation, the StationExchange trading hub collected $1.87 million in player 
transactions, providing a revenue to Sony of $274,000. See Noah Robischon, Station Exchange: 
Year One, GAMASUTRA (Jan. 19, 2007), http://www.scribd.com/doc/23941/SOE-
Station_Exchange-White-Paper-1-19; Michael Zenke, SOE’s Station Exchange—The Results of a 
Year of Trading Gamasutra, GAMASUTRA (Feb. 7, 2007), http://www.gamasutra.com/-
features/20070207/zenke_pfv.htm.  
 Staying with a property-based 
example, this would mean that a contractual term that purported to remove 
any claim that participants may have to their virtual assets in a community 
where the internal norms support an entitlement to assets that the provider 
 326. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 56 (2d ed. 1961) (arguing that rules become 
binding either because the community as a whole generally accepts them or because they are 
legitimately made by those who have the authority to make rules); see TAMANAHA, supra note 
98, at 119; cf. Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 20–21 (1967) 
(discussing and critiquing H.L.A. Hart’s positivism). 
 327. Post, supra note 122, at 913. 
 328. See Fairfield, supra note 55, at 463 (arguing that the internal norms of the 
community should be taken into consideration when interpreting the contractual terms of 
service). 
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has not effectively negated should not be upheld.329
The single largest difficulty with a consent model of virtual community 
governance is evaluating consent in fact. Communities are not all 
homogeneous and determining whether a community has consented to any 
given norm is an impossible task. Any such evaluation is most likely to 
proceed on an assumption of consent, which is a factual determination of 
whether or not the hypothetical reasonable person, joining and participating 
in the community, could be deemed to consent to the rule in question. 
Whilst clearly not a perfect model of consensual governance, this 
approximation at least provides an avenue for territorial courts to examine 
the internal social norms of the community in relation to both external values 
and contractual terms. Consent provides a useful indication of the internal 
legitimacy of community rules that can then be used as a normative guide as 
to whether the territorial state ought to support a particular contractual 
interpretation or not. 
 This approach accords 
well with rule of law ideals of legitimacy in governance, as well as the 
dominant justification for encouraging cyberspace self-rule in the first place: 
the proposition that better rules can be generated through consensual 
participation in virtual communities. Essentially, if a provider wishes to 
enforce certain contractual rules, it must ensure that those rules are 
understood and accepted by the community. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Governance within virtual communities occurs at the intersection of 
constraints from the market, the law, technology, internal community 
standards, and external social values. There is a trend in cyberlaw theory, 
however, that attempts to reduce the legitimacy of private governance to the 
drawing of borders. From the act of crossing over into cyberspace to the 
emphasis on private contract and property rights, these borders tend to 
delegitimize government intervention in the practice of governance in virtual 
communities. These conceptions of self-governance rely on assumptions 
about the technology, the market, and the communities that isolate 
participation from the remainder of society.  
                                                                                       
 329. Duranske further argues that:  
If a company wishes to profit by selling currency and land, and outright 
encourages users to make their real-life living in the virtual space, it 
cannot reasonably protest that the fine print says it is ‘only a game’ when 
faced with users who expect to extract that stored value or expect policies 
that genuinely protect the assets they have purchased. 
See DURANSKE, supra note 200, at 113. 
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Regulatory approaches that rely on deterministic projections of any of 
these forces are unlikely to provide satisfactory outcomes. The importance 
placed upon autonomy in much of cyberlaw theory risks overlooking the 
importance of restraints on the exercise of power within virtual communities. 
The tensions that permeate these communities are governance tensions and 
should be addressed as governance tensions. If governance in virtual 
communities is to be regulated through private law, then it is desirable to 
analyze the continued suitability of private law through constitutional 
discourses which are receptive to the potential threats posed by private 
governance. 
The values of the rule of law and the rights of citizens are continuously 
protected by the evolution of the private common law.330
                                                                                       
 330. DICEY, supra note 
 The myriad legal 
determinations regarding how power can be exercised by members of society 
substantially construct the rights and interests of all citizens. So too, in virtual 
communities, the boundaries of private law doctrines mediate the 
relationships between participants and providers, as they do in disputes 
between participants. The rule of law, as a discourse that emphasizes the 
legitimacy of governance and appropriate limits on the exercise of power, 
provides a useful framework as a first step to reconceptualizing and 
evaluating these tensions in communities at the intersection of the real and 
the virtual, the social and the economic, and the public and the private. 
1, at 187–88. 
